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STARE DECISIS AND RATIO DECIDENDI1
19.1 DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere literally means ‘to stand 
by the decision, and not to disturb the settled matters’ i.e. to stick 
with what has been decided or the like cases should be decided alike. 
The commonly used term is the doctrine of stare decisis or the rule of 
judicial precedent which dictates that it is necessary for each lower tier 
to accept loyally the decision of the higher tiers. Thus, a court other 
than the highest court is obliged generally to follow the decision of 
the court at a higher or the same level in the court structure subject to 
certain exceptions. The application of the doctrine from a higher court 
to a lower court is called the vertical stare decisis. Whereas, the notion 
that a judge is bound to follow or respect the decision of an earlier judge 
of similar or coordinate jurisdiction is called horizontal stare decisis.2 
Further, the rule of judicial precedent shall apply whenever the relevant 
facts of an earlier case is similar to the facts of a subsequent case, i.e. 
the relevant facts of the two cases are similar. However, if the facts are 
not similar then the earlier decision would be distinguished and as such 
would not be binding on the subsequent case.3
As the doctrine has been developed by the English courts and accepted 
by the Malaysian courts as part of the common law applicable by virtue 
of s. 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956, hence, it would be worthwhile to refer 
IntroductionCHAPTER 19
1 This chapter is contributed by Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed. Part of  this chapter has 
appeared in a different form as an article entitled ‘Civil Claims Involving Motor 
Vehicle Accidents: Whether Court of  Appeal the Apex Court?’ [2009] 1 MLJ xxii, 
‘Rationale For Departing From Stare Decisis: A Review of  Re Hj Khalid Abdullah; 
Ex P Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd [2008] 6 MLJ cxxv, and Dissenting opinion: The voice 
of  the future’ [2016] 4 MLJ (4) lxxiii and is produced here with the kind permission 
of  LexisNexis Malaysia Sdn Bhd.
2 See Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd v. Yong Wan Hoi & Ors [2007] 9 CLJ 416.
3 See Chai Kok Choi v. Ketua Polis Negara & Ors [2008] 1 CLJ 113.
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to the application of this doctrine in the courts in England. Before 
looking into the development of the doctrine in England, it would be 
worthwhile to briefly note the following terminologies:
(1) Binding precedent: A binding precedent is one which a court 
considers it must follow. For example, in Pasukhas Construction 
Sdn Bhd & Anor v. MTM Millenium Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor,4 
Mohd Hishamudin Mohd Yunus J while following the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Esso Petroleum Malaysia Inc v. Kago Petroleum 
Sdn Bhd,5 stated: “In the light of Esso Petroleum Malaysia Inc and 
LEC Contractors I am not at liberty to apply the unconscionability 
principle as propounded by the Singapore Court of Appeal case of 
Bocotra Construction – although some of our High Court decisions 
that I have mentioned above have applied that principle. Bocotra 
Construction, being a decision of the Court of Appeal of Singapore, 
is a persuasive authority; and the principle of unconscionability 
that it enunciated appears to me to be a sound principle. But, 
regrettably, I am bound by the doctrine of binding precedents. I 
am bound by the decision of the Supreme Court in Esso Petroleum 
Malaysia Inc (which applied the American Cyanamid principles) 
or, alternatively, by the decision of the Court of Appeal in LEC 
Contractors (which applied the fraud test).”
(2) Persuasive precedent: A persuasive precedent is one which a court 
is not bound to follow, but which it chooses to follow. An example 
of this would be the decisions of the superior courts in other parts 
of the commonwealth jurisdictions or judgment given by the Privy 
Council while hearing an appeal from a commonwealth country 
other than Malaysia. For example, in Re: Ann Joo Steel Berhad,6 
Kang Hwee Gee J referred to the decision of the Federal Court 
of Australia in Re Hunter Resources Ltd,7 which was approved 
in Nicron Resources Ltd v. Catto8 and thereafter stated that these 
decisions ‘should provide a persuasive precedent’.
4 [2009] 6 CLJ 480.
5 [1995] 1 CLJ 283, SC.
6 [2008] 1 LNS 688.
7 (1992) 7 ACSR 436.
8 (1992) 10 ACLC 1.
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(3) Overruling: The ratio of a case is subsequently declared to be 
wrong by a higher court hearing an appeal in a different case. For 
example, in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd,9 the 
House of Lords overruled the Court of Appeal in Candler v. Crane, 
Christmas & Co.10 If the House of Lords overrules one of its own 
earlier decisions, it may use the term ‘departing from a previous 
decision’. Overruling normally has full retrospective effect. It 
declares what the law always was. If an earlier case is overruled, 
that does not affect the position of the parties in the overruled 
case. The court will not entertain a new action by the losing party 
asking for the case to be reopened. The principle is, once an action 
has been decided, subject to any appeal which may be available, 
the cause of action merges with the judgment and becomes 
res judicata (a matter which has been judicially decided). This 
principle does not apply if the decision was obtained improperly, 
e.g. by fraud.
(4) Reversing: The ratio of a case is subsequently declared to be wrong 
by a higher court hearing an appeal against the decision in that 
case. For example, in Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala 
Lumpur v. Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors,11 the Court of Appeal had 
reversed the High Court’s decision which held inter alia, that the 
applicant had a constitutional right to use the word ‘Allah’ in the 
Malay version of its weekly publication. Again, in Zaibun Sa Syed 
Ahmad v. Loh Koon Moy & Anor12 the Privy Council held inter 
alia, that the Federal Court was entitled to exercise its discretion 
and was correct in reversing the decision of the trial judge and 
ordering specific performance of a contract for the sale of land.
9 [1964] AC 465.
10 [1951] 2 KB 164, CA.
11 [2010] 2 CLJ 208, HC; [2013] 8 CLJ 890, CA; [2014] 6 CLJ 541, FC.
12 [1982] CLJ 457, PC.
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(5) Disapproving: A higher court may ‘disapprove’ a decision of 
a lower court, in the sense of casting doubt on the ratio of the 
earlier case while not formally overruling it. Equally, a court may 
‘disapprove’ an obiter dictum of a judge in an earlier case. For 
example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Teh Geok Hock v. PP13 was 
no longer good law having been disapproved by the Federal Court 
in Chow Kok Keong v. PP.14 Again, in Koufos v. Czarnikow Ltd (The 
Heron II),15 the House of Lords disapproved of the foreseeability 
test propounded by Lord Asquith in the case of Victoria Laundry 
(Windsor) Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd.16 Similarly, the decision 
of the former Federal Court in the Damodaran v. Vesudevan17 was 
disapproved by the Privy Council in T. Damodaran v. Choe Kuan 
Him,18 although not expressly overruled.
(6) Distinguishing: Where a court distinguishes an earlier case on 
its facts, or on the point of law involved, it states some relevant 
point(s) of difference between the earlier case and the present case, 
usually in order to conclude that the ratio of the earlier case is not 
binding on it. This could be illustrated with reference to the Federal 
Court’s decisions in the following two cases: All Malayan Estates 
Staff Union v. Rajasegaran & Ors19 and Badan Peguam Malaysia 
v. Kerajaan Malaysia20 where in the above cases the Federal Court 
was faced with the correct interpretation of the phrase ‘seven years’ 
and ‘ten years’ preceding his appointment he has been an advocate 
and solicitor’ in the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (IRA) and the 
Federal Constitution, respectively. In All Malayan Estates Staff 
Union v. Rajasegaran & Ors, the Federal Court had to consider 
whether the appointment of the first respondent as Chairman 
13 [1989] 2 CLJ 977, SC.
14 [1998] 2 CLJ 469, FC.
15 [1969] 1 AC 350.
16 [1949] 2 KB 528.
17 [1975] 1 LNS 23, FC.
18 [1979] 1 LNS 107, PC.
19 [2006] 4 CLJ 195, FC.
20 [2008] 1 CLJ 521, FC.
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of the Industrial Court was in conformity with s. 23A(1) of the 
IRA, namely, whether the respondent had the requisite seven 
years standing in practice as an advocate and solicitor preceding 
his appointment as the chairman of the court. In this case, even 
though the respondent had been admitted and enrolled as an 
advocate and solicitor for eight years and one month at the date 
of his appointment, nevertheless, he was only in active practice 
for four years, nine months and 22 days. It was contended that in 
order for a person to be qualified to be a chairman of the Industrial 
Court, he or she must have been an advocate and solicitor with 
a valid practising certificate for the seven years preceding his 
appointment.
 Augustine Paul FCJ, delivering the judgment of the court, stated 
that a person who is entitled to practise as an advocate and solicitor, 
under the Legal Profession Act 1976, is one with a valid practising 
certificate. His Lordship further stated that the word ‘advocate and 
solicitor’ under s. 23A(1) has to be construed as a reference to an 
advocate and solicitor who has been in practice under the Legal 
Profession Act 1976. Further, the seven-year period in s. 23A(1) is 
closely connected to the qualification of a person as an advocate 
and solicitor and, therefore, due weight ought to be given to these 
words in order to determine its purpose rather than brushing it 
aside as a mere addition.
 His Lordship stated:
Thus, the purpose of the seven-year period in relation to a 
member of the judicial and legal service can be used to determine 
the purpose of the same period in the case of an advocate and 
solicitor. There can be no dispute that the reference to a member 
of the judicial and legal service is a reference to a person who 
has been employed as a legal officer. The seven-year period in 
relation to such an officer is therefore a reference to his working 
experience in that capacity for the prescribed number of years. 
Similarly, the need for a person to have been an advocate and 
solicitor for seven years preceding his appointment is obviously 
a reference to his practice or experience as such.21
21 Ibid, at p. 214.
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 Therefore, to qualify for the appointment as a Chairman, he or 
she must have been in active practice for seven-years or more 
preceding his or her appointment to such post.
 However, in Badan Peguam Malaysia v. Kerajaan Malaysia,22 
the issue before the Federal Court was on the appointment of 
Dr. Badariah binti Sahamid, who had less than 10 years in active 
practice as an advocate and solicitor, as a Judicial Commissioner 
of the High Court of Malaya. The majority decision held that her 
appointment as Judicial Commissioner was constitutional. The 
Federal Court’s decision in Rajasegaran’s case was distinguished 
on the basis that the Federal Court in Rajasegaran considered 
and construed the words ‘advocate and solicitor’ in the context of 
the IRA, an ordinary Act of Parliament, whereas, in the present 
case, it was a construction of art. 123 of the Federal Constitution. 
However, the minority decision, by Abdul Hamid Mohamad CJ, 
stated:
The requirement that a person must be an advocate for at least 
ten years is meant to cover advocates and solicitors who practise 
law. It is not meant to include people who are ‘only in name’ an 
advocate and solicitor merely by virtue of being admitted to the 
bar but spend their lives doing something else, whether teaching 
law, in business or politics. If they are intended to be included, 
the Constitution would and should have said so, as in Singapore 
or, more clearly in India which provides that a ‘distinguished 
jurist’ is also qualified to be appointed a judge.23
 His Lordship, in following Rajasegaran’s case, further stated:
I am unable to find any fault in that judgment to justify me to 
disagree with it. I am unable to find any justification to depart 
from it. On the other hand, to hold otherwise would lead to 
an absurd result in which, a non-practising advocate may not 
be appointed a Chairman of the Industrial Court but may be 
appointed a Judicial Commissioner, a judge of the High Court, 
a judge of the Court of Appeal, a judge of the Federal Court or 
22 [2008] 1 CLJ 521, FC.
23 Ibid, at p. 543.
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even the Chief Justice. He does not have to practise law even for 
a day. All he has to do is to get admitted to the Bar, then may 
be go into business and/or into politics and after ten years he 
is qualified to be appointed even as a Chief Justice. That is the 
implication if this court were to rule otherwise.24
 Again, in Mohd. Raihan Ibrahim & Anor v. Government of Malaysia 
& Ors,25 the first appellant sustained injuries when he was 
accidentally struck on the head by a changkol wielded by a 
fellow pupil in the course of a practical gardening class. Salleh 
Abas FJ, delivering the judgment of the Federal Court held that 
the respondents were negligent for failing to take all reasonable 
and proper steps to prevent the appellant under their care from 
sustaining the injury and that their teacher did not check the 
condition of the garden tools nor provided a safe system of holding 
the gardening class. His Lordship distinguished the present case 
with their own earlier decision in Government of Malaysia & Ors 
v. Jumat bin Mahmud & Anor.26 In particular, his Lordship stated:
This is not a case where the teacher, as in the case of Government 
of Malaysia & Ors v. Jumat ..., had provided sufficient supervision 
but could not prevent the injury from being inflicted because of 
the stupidity of a pupil, whose exuberant behaviour was unknown 
to the teacher. But this is a case where a teacher appreciating that 
the boys were handling dangerous instruments had not given 
sufficient warning as to their use nor had she taken steps to 
see that pupils were positioned within such distance between 
them as to avoid injuries from being inflicted. There is a world 
of difference between the use of a changkol and that of a pencil.
(7) Conflicting decisions: Where a court decides that the rationes 
of more than one earlier binding cases are inconsistent with one 
another, it may choose which to follow. For example, there are 
conflicting decisions of the Federal Court on the issue whether 
24 Ibid, at pp. 543-544.
25 [1982] CLJ 150, FC.
26 [1977] 1 LNS 29, FC.
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this Court has the power, inherent or as conferred by r. 137 of 
the Rules of the Federal Court 1995, to review its own decision. 
In Pan Flex Sdn Bhd v. Amalan Tepat Sdn Bhd,27 it was held that 
this Court has no such jurisdiction or power, mainly because 
neither the Federal Constitution nor the Courts of Judicature 
Act 1964 confers such jurisdiction or power on this Court. It was 
further stated that r. 137, being a subsidiary legislation, could 
not confer such jurisdiction or power on this Court. The Federal 
Court in Amalan Tepat case had followed the minority view in 
the case of Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP.28 The opposite view 
was expressed in Sia Cheng Soon & Anor v. Tengku Ismail Tengku 
Ibrahim,29 where it was held inter alia, that r. 137 does not confer 
such jurisdiction, it merely declares that the Federal Court being 
a court of law, by necessary implication is conferred with such 
inherent power. Given the conflicting decisions as above, Arifin 
Zakaria CJ, delivering the judgment of the Federal Court in the 
recent case of Dato’ See Teow Chuan & Ors v. Ooi Woon Chee 
& Ors and other applications30 stated that “the inherent power of 
the Court to review its decision as declared in r. 137 is a necessary 
power which is inbuilt or intrinsic in the court, as the court of 
justice. This power may be equated to the powers of the courts to 
dismiss an action for want of prosecution or to the power of court 
to strike out any pleading or indorsement of any writ in the action 
under the Rules of Court 2012. This inherent power is derived 
from the inherent jurisdiction of the court which is to do justice 
and to prevent any abuse of process. This power springs not from 
legislation but from the nature and constitution of the court as a 
dispenser of justice. And this inherent power can only be taken 
away by express provision in any written law.”
27 [2012] 2 CLJ 687, FC.
28 [2010] 7 CLJ 397, FC.
29 [2008] 5 CLJ 201.
30 [2013] 4 CLJ 901, FC.
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Having noted the above, the following discussion is relation to the 
working of the doctrine in England and in Malaysia.
19.1.1 Application In England
Criminal Both Civil
Û
Û
Þ	 Ý
 
Û	 Û
 
Prior to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (2005 Act), the House of 
Lords was the highest court in England and Wales and its decisions 
were binding on the courts below and further, the House of Lords was 
also bound by its own decision. However, pursuant to the 2005 Act, 
the Supreme Court is the highest appeal court in the UK for civil cases, 
and for criminal cases from England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The new Supreme Court opened for business in October 2009, at the 
start of the legal year. Below the Supreme Court is the Court of Appeal 
which consists of Civil Division and Criminal Division. The High 
Court functions both as a civil court of first instance and a criminal 
and civil appellate court for cases from the subordinate courts. The 
High Court consists of three divisions namely, the Queen’s Bench, the 
Chancery and the Family divisions. The Crown Court is a criminal 
court of both original and appellate jurisdiction. All criminal cases will 
start in the Magistrates Court, but the more serious criminal matters 
are tried in the Crown Court. Appeals from the Crown Court will lie 
with the High Court, and potentially to the Court of Appeal or even the 
Supreme Court. Meanwhile, civil cases will sometimes be dealt with 
Supreme Court
Court of Appeal
High Court
Crown Court
Magistrates Court
Country Court
Tribunals
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by Magistrates, but may well go to a County Court. Again, appeals will 
go to the High Court and then to the Court of Appeal – although to 
different divisions of those courts.31
Having stated briefly the hierarchy of courts as above, in relation to the 
doctrine or rule of judicial precedent, the House of Lords, in London 
Tramways v. London County Council,32 stated that its decision binds the 
courts below. Furthermore, it was bound by its own previous decision 
in the interest of finality and certainty of the law. A previous decision 
could be questioned by the House when it conflicted with another 
decision of the House or when it was made per incuriam, and that the 
correction of error was normally dependent on the legislative process.
In fact, prior to 1966, the position was that a decision of the House of 
Lords on a question of law was conclusive and bound the House in a 
subsequent case. The law as so stated by the House could be changed 
only by an Act of Parliament. However, since July 1966, Lord Gardiner, 
the then Lord Chancellor, announced a departure from this rule which 
is contained in the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) 1966.33 It 
provides, inter alia:
While treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, 
to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so. 
In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing 
retrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlements of property 
and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also the especial 
need for certainty as to the criminal law. This announcement is not 
intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than in this House.
31 See http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/introduction-to-justice-system/
court-structure.
32 [1898] AC 375.
33 [1966] 2 MLJ xi.
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The application of this doctrine in the civil division of the English Court 
of Appeal can be found in the judgment of the full court consisting 
of six judges34 in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd.35 It provides inter 
alia, that the House of Lords decision shall bind the Court of Appeal; 
that the court is bound by its own earlier decisions except for three 
situations namely; ‘(1) the court is entitled and bound to decide which 
of the two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow; (2) the court 
is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which, though not 
expressly overruled, cannot, in its opinion, stand with a decision of the 
House of Lords; and (3) the court is not bound to follow a decision 
of its own if it is satisfied that the decision was given per incuriam.’ 
Whereas, the application of the doctrine in the criminal division of the 
English Court of Appeal may be illustrated with reference to the case of 
R v. Gould.36 In this case, Diplock LJ stated:
In its criminal jurisdiction, which it has inherited from the Court of 
Criminal Appeal, the Court of Appeal does not apply the doctrine of 
stare decisis with the same rigidity as in its civil jurisdiction. If on due 
consideration we were to be of opinion that the law had been either 
misapplied or misunderstood in an earlier decision of this court, or 
its predecessor the Court of Criminal Appeal, we should be entitled 
to depart from the view as to the law expressed in the earlier decision 
notwithstanding that the case could not be brought within any of the 
exceptions laid down in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd.
19.1.2 Application In Malaysia
In Malaysia, the superior courts comprises the two High Courts of 
coordinate jurisdiction and status, namely the High Court of Malaya 
and the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak; the Court of Appeal and the 
Federal Court. The subordinate courts are the Magistrates’ Courts and 
the Sessions Court. The Federal Court, effective 24 June 1994, stands 
at the apex of this pyramid. It is the highest judicial authority and the 
34 Lord Greene MR, Scott, MacKinnon, Luxmoore, Goddard and du Parcq LJJ. 
35 [1944] 1 KB 718.
36 [1968] 2 QB 65.
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final court of appeal. Before 1 January 1985, the defunct Federal Court 
remained the second highest court in the land, whose decisions were 
further appealable to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
in London. However, on 1 January 1978, appeal to Privy Council in 
criminal and constitutional matters was abolished and on 1 January 
1985, all other appeals i.e. civil appeals except those filed before that date 
were abolished. When appeals to the Privy Council were abolished, the 
defunct Federal Court was renamed as the Supreme Court of Malaysia 
which became the apex court. Finally, on 24 June 1994, the apex court 
was once again renamed as the Federal Court of Malaysia. Meanwhile, 
the Court of Appeal was also set up on 24 June 1994 after the Federal 
Constitution was amended vide Act A885. Further, the Special Court 
for the Rulers was established on 30 March 1993 vide Act A848, now 
provided for in arts. 182 and 183 of the Federal Constitution. All 
offences committed by His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the 
Rulers of the states shall be tried in the Special Court. The Special Court 
shall also hear all civil cases by or against them.
Having said the above, the application of the doctrine in Malaysia may 
be illustrated with reference to the case of PP v. Datuk Tan Cheng Swee 
& Anor,37 where Chang Min Tat FJ said:
It is however necessary to reaffirm the doctrine of stare decisis which 
the Federal Court accepts unreservedly and which it expects the High 
Court and other inferior Courts in a common law system such as ours, 
to follow similarly.
Again, in Kathavarayan v. Ng Sup Moi & Anor,38 Siti Norma Yaakob J 
said:
The principle of stare decisis has long been accepted by our Courts and 
this was reaffirmed again in the case of ... Datuk Tan Cheng Swee ... 
where the Federal Court held that ‘the principle requires more than lip 
service’. Being a lower tribunal, I am duty bound to follow the precedent 
set by the Federal Court.
37 [1980] 1 LNS 58, [1980] 2 MLJ 276 at p. 277.
38 [1985] 1 LNS 8, [1987] 1 MLJ 246 at p. 250.
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In The Co-operative Central Bank Ltd v. Feyen Development Sdn Bhd,39 
it was stated that it was necessary for each lower tier to accept loyally 
the decision of the higher tiers and chaotic consequences would follow 
should the lower tier fail in his duty.
It is also worthwhile to refer to the Federal Court’s decision in Dalip 
Bhagwan Singh v. PP,40 where Peh Swee Chin FCJ stated:
The doctrine of stare decisis or the rule of judicial precedent dictates that 
a court other than the highest court is obliged generally to follow the 
decisions of the courts at a higher or the same level in the court structure 
subject to certain exceptions affecting especially the Court of Appeal. 
The said exceptions are as decided in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd 
[1944] KB 718. The part of the decision in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane 
in regard to the said exceptions to the rule of judicial precedent ought 
to be accepted by us as part of the common law applicable by virtue of 
Civil Law Act 1956, vide its s. 3 ... There are of course further possible 
exceptions in addition to the three exceptions in Young v. Bristol 
Aeroplane when there may be cases the circumstances of which cry out 
for such new exceptions so long as they are not inconsistent with the 
3 exceptions in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane ... In our local context, the 
Federal Court is to be substituted for the House of Lords with regard 
to the matter under discussion. In this connection, it is interesting to 
refer to Cassell & Co. v. Broome [1972] AC 1027, 1054. It was held that 
courts in the lower tiers below the Court of Appeal could not rely on 
the per incuriam rule applied by Court of Appeal for itself, but could 
choose between two conflicting decisions. We may add that they may 
so choose, whatever the dates of the conflicting decisions, as such 
dates do not matter to the Court of Appeal itself ... Experience in the 
United Kingdom has shown that the power ‘to depart from a previous 
decision when it appears right to do so’ has been used very sparingly. 
In Malaysia, the Federal Court and its forerunner i.e., Supreme Court, 
after all appeals to the Privy Council were abolished, has never refused 
to depart from its own decision when it appeared right to do so, see the 
above-mentioned Federal Court’s cases on the question of burden of 
proof at the close of prosecution case. Though the Practice Statement 
39 [1997] 3 CLJ 365.
40 [1997] 4 CLJ 645.
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(Judicial Precedent) 1966, of the House of Lords is not binding at all 
on us, it has indeed and in practice been followed, though such power 
to depart from its own previous decision has been exercised sparingly 
also. It is right that we in the Federal Court, should have this power 
to do so but it is suggested that it should be used very sparingly on 
the important reason of the consequences of such overruling involved 
for it cannot be lost on the mind of anybody that a lot of people have 
regulated their affairs in reliance on a ratio decidendi before it is 
overruled. In certain circumstances, it would be far more prudent to 
call for legislative intervention. On the other hand, the power to do 
so depart is indicated (subject to a concurrent consideration of the 
question of the consequences), when a former decision which is sought 
to be overruled is wrong, uncertain, unjust or outmoded or obsolete 
in the modern conditions ... If the House of Lords, and by analogy, 
the Federal Court, departs from its previous decision when it is right 
to do so in the circumstances set out above, then also by necessary 
implication, its decision represents the present state of the law. When 
two decisions of the Federal Court conflict, on a point of law, the 
later decision therefore, for the same reasons, prevails over the earlier 
decision.
Again, in Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v. Tay Chai Huat,41 Mohd Ghazali 
Yusoff FCJ, delivering the judgment of the Federal Court, stated:
The common law tradition is built on the doctrine of stare decisis which 
directs a court to look to past decisions for guidance on how to decide 
a case before it. This means that the legal rules applied to a prior case 
with facts similar to those of the case now before a court should be 
applied to resolve the legal dispute. The use of precedent has been 
justified as providing predictability, stability, fairness and efficiency in 
the law. Reliance upon precedent contributes predictability to the law 
because it provides notice of what a person’s rights and obligations are 
in particular circumstances. It also means that lawyers can give legal 
advice to clients based on settled rules of law. There is certainty in the 
law. There is also uniformity in the law. Similar cases will be treated in 
the same way. The use of precedent also stabilises the law. This Court 
create precedents. The use of precedent is an indispensable foundation 
on which to decide what is the law and how it should be applied in 
individual cases. Utra Badi and Vickeswary are decisions that settled 
41 [2012] 3 CLJ 577, FC.
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the law in cases of this genre with finality. I would think that this Court 
would have need to hesitate long before distinguishing Utra Badi and 
Vickneswary on inadequate grounds or on a hypothetical issue raised 
by appellants in appeals before this Court such as whether there are 
exceptions to the ratio decidendi formulated in both authorities. Such 
hypothetical issues raised in cases of this genre can have disruptive 
and seemingly unfair consequences and extremely capricious 
results. It creates uncertainty in the law and would seriously hinder 
administration of the General Orders by government departments 
resulting in administrative confusion.
19.2 ADHERENCE TO STARE DECISIS IN THE INTEREST 
OF CERTAINTY AND FINALITY OF LAW
There are numerous judicial pronouncements of the superior courts in 
Malaysia as well as other common law jurisdictions calling for among 
others, a strict adherence to this doctrine. The observance of the 
doctrine is necessary in the interest of finality and certainty in the law 
and for an orderly development of legal rules as well as for the courts 
and lawyers to regulate their affairs. Any failure to observe the same 
may create chaos and the misapprehensions in the judicial system.42 In 
Mirehouse v. Rennell,43 Baron Parke stated:
Our common-law system consists in the applying to new combinations 
of circumstances those rules of law which we derive from legal principles 
and judicial precedents; and for the sake of attaining uniformity, 
consistency and certainty, we must apply those rules, where they are not 
plainly unreasonable and inconvenient, to all cases which arise; and we 
are not at liberty to reject them, and to abandon all analogy to them, 
in those to which they have not yet been judicially applied, because we 
think that the rules are not as convenient and reasonable as ourselves 
could have devised. It appears to me to be of great importance to keep this 
principle of decision steadily in view, not merely for the determination of 
the particular case, but for the interests of law as a science.
42 ‘The need for an orderly development of  legal rules and certainty of  the law 
requires strict observance of  the doctrine of  stare decisis, and to borrow the words 
of  Chang Min Tat FJ, it requires more than lip service.’ Per Balia Yusof  J in Esah 
Ishak & Anor v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor [2006] 7 CLJ 353.
43 (1833) 1 Cl & Fin 527 at p. 547.
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Again, in Velasquez Ltd v. Inland Revenue Commissioners,44 Cozens- 
Hardy MR stated: “But there is one rule by which, of course, we are 
to abide – that when there has been a decision of this court upon a 
question of principle, it is not right for this court, whatever its own 
views may be, to depart from that decision. There would otherwise 
be no finality in the law”. Likewise, in the Practice Statement (Judicial 
Precedent) 196645 issued by the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner, 
states as follows: “Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an 
indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and 
its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of 
certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, 
as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules.”
In Cassell & Co Ltd v. Broome & Anor,46 Lord Diplock said:
The judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the last 
word and if that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted. The Court 
of Appeal found themselves able to disregard the decision of this House 
in Rookes v. Barnard by applying to it the label per incuriam. That label 
is relevant only to the right of an appellate court to decline to follow one 
of its own previous decisions, not to its right to disregard a decision of 
a higher appellate court or to the right of a judge of the High Court to 
disregard a decision of the Court of Appeal. Even if the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Appeal had been co-ordinate with the jurisdiction of this House 
and not inferior to it the label per incuriam would have been misused.
Lord Hailsham in Cassell’s case stated:
I am driven to the conclusion that when the Court of Appeal described 
the decision in Rookes v. Barnard as decided ‘per incuriam’ or 
‘unworkable’, they really only meant that they did not agree with it. But, 
in my view, even if this were not so, it is not open to the Court of Appeal 
to give gratuitous advice to judges of first instance to ignore decisions 
of the House of Lords in this way and, if it were open to the Court 
of Appeal to do so, it would be highly undesirable. The course taken 
would have put judges of first instance in an embarrassing position, as 
44 [1914] 3 KB 458 at p. 461.
45 [1966] 1 WLR 1234. See also [1966] 2 MLJ xi.
46 [1972] 1 All ER 801 at p. 874.
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driving them to take sides in an unedifying dispute between the Court 
of Appeal or three members of it (for there is no guarantee the other 
Lords Justices would have followed them and no particular reason 
why they should) and the House of Lords. But, much worse than this, 
litigants would have not known where they stood. None could have 
reached finality short of the House of Lords and in the meantime, the 
task of their professional advisers of advising them either as to their 
rights, or as to the probable cost of obtaining or defending them, would 
have been, quite literally, impossible. Whatever the merits, chaos would 
have reigned until the dispute was settled, and in legal matters, some 
degree of certainty is at least as valuable part of justice as perfection.
In an article entitled ‘The Judge as Lawmaker’, Lord Reid noted: “judges 
are human ... if they do not like an existing decision or ratio because it 
will produce an unjust or unreasonable result in the case before them 
they try to distinguish it. And that is where the trouble starts, and you 
begin to get an impenetrable maze of distinctions and qualifications 
which destroy certainty because no one advising on a new case can 
predict how it will go”.47
In Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd v. Yong Wan Hoi & Ors,48 Abdul 
Malik Ishak J (now JCA) stated:
Now, although the lower courts are bound in theory by the superior or 
higher court precedents, in practice judges may sometimes attempt to 
evade precedents, by distinguishing them on spurious grounds. It is, 
however, advisable to follow the doctrine of stare decisis because it is 
a wise policy. It is important that the applicable law be settled. There 
must be certainty in the law.
In Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau 
Pinang & Anor v. Utra Badi K Perumal,49 the Federal Court said:
it was necessary for each lower tier to accept loyally the decision of the 
higher tiers and chaotic consequences would follow should the lower 
tier fail in this duty. It was therefore not open to an intermediate Court 
47 Lord Reid, ‘The Judge as Lawmaker’ (1972-73) 12 JSPTL (NS) 22–23. 
48 [2007] 9 CLJ 416.
49 [2001] 2 CLJ 525 at p. 562.
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of Appeal, such as the Court of Appeal in this country, to disregard a 
judgment of a final Court of Appeal such as the Federal Court on the 
ground that it was given per incuriam.
In Koperasi Rakyat Bhd v. Harta Empat Sdn Bhd,50 Gopal Sri Ram JCA 
for the Federal Court said:
In an earlier passage in the same judgment, this court made clear the 
need to observe with rigour the doctrine of stare decisis ... Great care 
must be taken especially in a case as the present which concerns the 
interpretation of a statutory provision. It should not be done save in 
the most exceptional of cases. Otherwise it would lead to uncertainty. 
Men of business must be in a position to organize their affairs in such 
a fashion that they keep well within the framework of the law. And 
members of the legal profession must be able to advise their clients with 
some degree of certainty as to what the law is upon a particular subject 
matter. Certainty in the law is therefore one of the pillars upon which 
our justice system rests.
Again, in Periasamy Sinnappan v. PP,51 Gopal Sri Ram JCA said:
Lastly the learned appellate judge did not sufficiently address his mind 
to the decision in Khoo Hi Chiang. We find the cavalier fashion on 
which he approached the judgment of a five-member bench of the 
Supreme Court in a case which was an authority binding upon him to 
be quite appalling. We are convinced that the learned judge ought not 
to have brushed it aside as he did. We may add that it does not augur 
well for judicial discipline when a High Court judge treats the decision 
of the Supreme Court with little or no respect in disobedience to the 
well- entrenched doctrine of stare decisis. We trust that the occasion 
will never arise again when we have to remind High Court judges that 
they are bound by all judgments of this court and of the Federal Court 
and they must, despite any misgivings a judge may entertain as to the 
correctness of a particular judgment of either court, apply the law as 
stated therein.
50 [2000] 3 CLJ 719 at pp. 724-727.
51 [1996] 3 CLJ 187 at pp. 213-214.
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In Tai Chai Yu v. The Chief Registrar of the Federal Court,52 Gopal Sri 
Ram JCA once again said:
A final decision of the Federal Court, once pronounced, is binding 
upon the parties thereto and its correctness may only be questioned in 
a subsequent case where the identical point of law arises for decision.
In Anchorage Mall Sdn Bhd v. Irama Team (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor,53 
the court had to consider the submission advanced on behalf of the 
defendant urging the court not to follow Alor Janggus Soon Seng 
Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors.54 Ahmad Maarop JC 
referred to the statements made in the following judgments namely, PP 
v. Datuk Tan Cheng Swee & Anor,55 The Co-operative Central Bank Ltd 
v. Feyen Development Sdn Bhd,56 Cassell & Co Ltd v. Broome & Anor,57 
and Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd,58 and thereafter made the 
following observation:
Indeed, in the light of these authorities, I do not think it is open to me 
to disregard or refuse to follow the decision in Alor Janggus unless and 
until it is reversed by the Federal Court. In any case I am of the view 
that even if what was said by the Supreme Court in Alor Janggus on  
O. 18 r. 19 of the RHC was merely obiter, being a judicial pronouncement 
emanating from the highest court in this country then, it deserves the 
utmost respect and should be followed as a guide as faithfully as possible.
In Dato’ Tan Heng Chew v. Tan Kim Hor & Another Appeal,59 Steve Shim 
CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) stated:
The Court of Appeal is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to follow 
the ‘real danger of bias’ test for recusal adopted by the Federal Court 
in Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v. Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama 
Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 CLJ 65 and 
52 [1998] 2 CLJ 358 at p. 360.
53 [2001] 7 CLJ 313.
54 [1995] 1 CLJ 461.
55 [1980] 1 LNS 58.
56 [1997] 3 CLJ 365.
57 [1972] 2 WLR 645.
58 [1975] 2 WLR 555.
59 [2006] 1 CLJ 577.
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Mohamed Ezam bin Mohd Nor & Ors v. Ketua Polis Negara [2001] 4 
CLJ 701. It is axiomatic to state that the doctrine of stare decisis has 
become the cornerstone of the common law system practiced in this 
country. It is fundamental to its existence and to the rule of law. It 
has attained the status of immutability ... Judicial hierarchy must be 
observed in the interests of finality and certainty in the law and for 
orderly development of legal rules as well as for the courts and lawyers 
to regulate their affairs. Failure to observe judicial precedents would 
create chaos and misapprehensions in the judicial system. This fact 
was certainly borne in mind by the Court of Appeal in Periasamy s/o 
Sinnappan & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1996] 3 CLJ 187; [1996] 2 MLJ 
557 wherein Gopal Sri Ram JCA said (at p. 582): “We may add that it 
does not augur well for judicial discipline when a High Court judge 
treats the decision of the Supreme Court with little or no respect in 
disobedience to the well-entrenched doctrine of stare decisis. We trust 
that the occasion will never arise again when we have to remind High 
Court judges that they are bound by all judgments of this court and 
of the Federal Court and they must, despite any misgivings a judge 
may entertain as to the correctness of a particular judgment of either 
court, apply the law as stated therein”. The observation is but a stark 
reminder to judges of the importance of adhering to the doctrine. 
That observation, although made in the context of a peculiar factual 
setting, is, in my view, equally applicable to the particular situation in 
the instant case where the Court of Appeal has refused, for insufficient 
reasons, to follow and apply the ‘real danger of bias’ test for recusal 
enunciated by the Federal Court in Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang 
and Mohamed Ezam. Until such time when the Federal Court holds 
otherwise, this test must remain entrenched and binding on all inferior 
courts including the Court of Appeal. Certainty in the law must prevail.
Justice Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ delivering a separate judgment 
of the court in Dato’ Tan Heng Chew’s case, referred to the earlier 
Federal Court’s decision in Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v. Syarikat 
Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan60 
and Mohamed Ezam Mohd Nor & Ors v. Ketua Polis Negara61 and said:
60 [1999] 3 CLJ 65.
61 [2001] 4 CLJ 701.
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These judgments, being judgments of the Federal Court, are binding 
on the Court of Appeal. Whether the Court of Appeal agrees with them 
or not, it is incumbent upon it to apply the test. However, if the court 
thinks that it has good reasons for disagreeing with the judgments, it 
may, while following them, point out why they should be reviewed by 
this court. But the review, if it were to be done, should be done by this 
court. Until it is actually done by this court, they remain binding on the 
Court of Appeal. So, the Court of Appeal was wrong in not applying the 
‘real danger of bias’ test.
19.3 DECISIONS OFFENDING STARE DECISIS AND ITS 
EFFECT: AN ILLUSTRATION
19.3.1 Supreme Court’s decision in Chan Chin Min & Anor v. Lim 
Yok Eng
It has been noted in some decided cases for example, in Noraini Omar 
& Anor v. Rohani Said & Another Appeal,62 the Court of Appeal was 
faced with the question whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Chan 
Chin Min & Anor v. Lim Yok Eng (Lawful Mother of Gan Swee Hock, 
Deceased),63 was binding on them. Earlier, the Court of Appeal had, in 
Takong Tabari v. Government of Sarawak & Ors & Another Appeal,64 
and Teoh Teik Chai v. Muhamad Hashim,65 held that they were bound 
by the majority decision in Chan Chin Min’s case. However, in Ibrahim 
Ismail & Anor v. Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor and Another Appeal,66 and 
Cheng Bee Teik & Ors v. Peter Selvaraj & Anor,67 this court held that 
Chan Chin Min was wrongly decided by the majority and therefore, 
it ought not to be followed. Gopal Sri Ram JCA, in Ibrahim Ismail 
& Anor, delivering the judgment of the court, stated:
62 [2006] 1 CLJ 895, CA.
63 [1994] 3 CLJ 687, SC.
64 [1998] 4 CLJ 589.
65  (Unreported), Civil Appeal No. P-45 of  1995. 
66 [2004] 1 CLJ 797.
67 [2005] 2 CLJ 839.
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Chan Chin Ming was decided before the establishment of this court. 
It was decided at a point of time when the High Court had original 
jurisdiction over personal injury and fatal accident claims. Appeals 
were preferred to the Supreme Court which stood at the apex of 
the judicature. That is not the case today. All personal injury and 
fatal accident claims are now solely within the jurisdiction of the 
subordinate courts. Appeals are to the High Court and finally to this 
court. We therefore now stand at the apex in respect of these claims. 
If a decision - and more so as here a majority decision - of the former 
Supreme Court is obviously wrong, then it is our plain duty to say so. 
It will, with respect, be an abdication of our solemn duty to simply fold 
our arms in abject submission and permit an erroneous statement of 
the law to continue to form part of our jurisprudence especially when it 
results in an injustice to a litigant.
Justice Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA in Noraini Omar’s case stated:
Notwithstanding that it [Chan Chin Ming’s case] was a majority 
decision, it was a decision of a court of a higher tier, and the apex court 
at that. That a court has to accept loyally a considered decision of a 
court of a higher tier and is not entitled to question it was reiterated by 
Lord Hailsham in ... Cassell and Co Ltd v. Broome [1972] AC 1027 ... We 
have to accept the decisions of the higher court even if we do not agree 
with them, and as regards the decision in Chan Chin Ming, there is no 
necessity for me in this appeal to say whether I think the decision was 
right or wrong.
However, the majority comprising of Arifin Zakaria JCA and Nik 
Hashim JCA held in favour of Ibrahim Ismail and Cheng Bee Teik. 
According to Arifin Zakaria JCA:
We agreed with the decision of this court in Ibrahim bin Ismail in that 
as regard fatal accident and personal injury claims, this court, as the 
apex court involving such claims, at the present moment, is at liberty 
to depart from the decision of the Supreme Court if we think that the 
decision of the Supreme Court was wrong.
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Given the fact that the Court of Appeal is now divided on the issue 
whether the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Chan Chin Min 
is binding on them, the judges in the courts below were placed ‘in an 
embarrassing position, as driving them to take sides.’68 They had to take 
sides between Chan Chin Min and Ibrahim Ismail. The High Court 
however, still relies on the majority decision in Chan Chin Min. For 
example, in Marimuthu Velappan v. Abdullah Ismail,69 VT Singham J 
said:
Under the pressing, peculiar and extraordinary circumstances and 
the strain which is imposed upon this court, it may by implication be 
seen as going towards that direction by following the decision of the 
Supreme Court in ... [Chan Chin Min] which seemed to be unavoidable 
not because of any choices, as both the decisions are binding upon this 
court but solely and strictly to keep up with the doctrine of stare decisis 
or binding judicial precedent.
Again, in Esah Ishak & Anor v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor,70 the majority 
decision in Chan Chin Min was followed. For example, in Esah Ishak’s 
case, Balia Yusof J stated:
The need for an orderly development of legal rules and certainty of the 
law requires strict observance of the doctrine of stare decisis, and to 
borrow the words of Chang Min Tat FJ, it requires more than lip service. 
As judges of the inferior and lower tier courts, our hands are tied and 
are always bound by this doctrine of stare decisis. We are guided and 
constantly reminded by the strong words of his Lordship Gopal Sri 
Ram JCA who in Periasamy s/o Sinnapan & Anor v. PP [1996] 3 CLJ 187 
cautioned in the fashion as follows: “We may add that it does not auger 
well for judicial discipline when a High Court Judge treats the decision 
of the Supreme Court with little or no respect in disobedience to the 
well entrenched doctrine of stare decisis. We trust that the occasion 
will never arise again when we have to remind High Court Judges that 
they are bound by all judgments of this Court and of the Federal Court 
and they must, despite any misgivings a judge may entertain as to the 
correctness of a particular judgment of either court, apply the law ... 
68 Per Lord Hailsham in Cassell & Co Ltd v. Broome & Anor [1972] AC 1027 at p. 1054.
69 [2007] 1 CLJ 436.
70 [2006] 7 CLJ 353.
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In conformity with the above stated principle and reasons, I hold that 
the learned sessions judge’s reliance on the case of Chan Chin Min in 
awarding the multiplier of seven years to the appellants in the instant 
appeal is faultless. The discretion still lies with her in determining the 
number of years” purchase (or multiplier) by taking into account the 
contingencies and circumstances of the case. On the facts of the case 
presented, there is nothing distinguishable from the facts in Chan Chin 
Min and coincidentally the facts of this appeal are almost if not wholly 
similar with the facts in Chan Chin Min, namely a claim made by a 
dependent of an unmarried deceased person.
It was only recently that the Federal Court in Abdul Ghaffar Md Amin 
v. Ibrahim Yusoff & Anor,71 resolved the above issue. Arifin Zakaria 
FCJ, delivering the judgment of the Federal Court, reiterated his earlier 
observation in Noraini Omar’s case. His Lordship stated:
As far as fatal accident and personal injury claims arising from motor 
vehicle accidents are concerned, the Court of Appeal stands as the apex 
court, as such no further appeal shall lie to this court (see s. 67(1) and 
s. 96(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964.) That is the intention of 
the Legislature and it is incumbent upon this court to give effect to it. 
When the law states that the decision of the Court of Appeal is final 
then the appeal process should stop at the Court of Appeal; it cannot be 
allowed to come to this court by way of a review process under r. 137 of 
the Rules of the Federal Court 1995.
19.3.2 Federal Court’s Decision In Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd  
v. Boonsom Boonyanit
In Subramaniam NS Dhurai v. Sandrakasan Retnasamy & Ors,72 the 
Court of Appeal held that the decision of the apex court ought not to 
be followed when it was given per incuriam. Gopal Sri Ram JCA stated 
inter alia, that the courts should no longer treat themselves bound by 
the Federal Court judgment in Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v. Boonsom 
Boonyanit,73 as the said decision was decided per incuriam. According 
71 [2008] 5 CLJ 1, FC.
72 [2005] 3 CLJ 539.
73 [2001] 2 CLJ 133.
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to His Lordship, the Federal Court in Adorna Properties had ignored 
the definition of ‘proprietor’ and ‘purchaser’ in s. 5 of the National Land 
Code and further, did not have regard to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in M & J Frozen Food Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Siland Sdn Bhd & Anor.74 In 
particular, His Lordship stated:
The Federal Court in the Adorna Properties case did not have regard 
to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in M & J Frozen Foods. 
Worse, it did not have regard to s. 5 of the Code. I do not think that 
I should fall off the proverbial cliff. I think that I must strike out in 
the right direction ... Accordingly, in my judgment our courts should 
no longer treat themselves bound by the Federal Court judgment in 
Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd as it was decided per incuriam. It follows 
that this court and the High Courts must now proceed on the basis 
that the Code provides for deferred and not immediate indefeasibility.75
The opinion expressed by Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Subramaniam NS 
Dhurai’s case as above, was however, not concurred by Ahmad Fairuz 
FCJ. His Lordship stated:
Saya telah membaca draf alasan penghakiman Gopal Sri Ram 
HMR dan saya bersetuju dengan penghakiman itu kecuali setakat 
mana penghakiman itu menyatakan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah 
Persekutuan di dalam kes Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v. Boonsom 
Boonyanit [2001] 2 CLJ 133 ... adalah per incuriam dan oleh itu 
mahkamah-mahkamah tidak perlu lagi menganggap mereka terikat 
dengan keputusan itu. Berasaskan prinsip duluan kehakiman mengikat 
(judicial precedent) saya berpendapat mahkamah ini tidak mempunyai 
pilihan kecuali menerima dan mematuhi keputusan Mahkamah 
Persekutuan di dalam kes Adorna Properties Saya berpendapat semua 
mahkamah yang bidang kuasanya lebih rendah dari Mahkamah 
Persekutuan hendaklah mematuhi kes ini sehingga ianya ditolak 
atau digantikan dengan kes perundangan yang lain dari Mahkamah 
Persekutuan.76
74 [1994] 2 CLJ 14.
75 Ibid at pp. 128-129.
76 Ibid at pp. 130-131.
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In Au Meng Nam & Anor v. Ung Yak Chew & Ors,77 Gopal Sri Ram 
JCA once again referred to the Federal Court’s decision in the Adorna 
Properties which according to His Lordship was decided per incuriam 
and thus, no court in this country need to follow the said decision. His 
Lordship said:
In my judgment, the decision in Adorna Properties is not to be treated 
as binding precedent because it was decided per incuriam. Federal 
Court ... overlooked the critical words ‘to whom it may subsequently be 
transferred’ appearing in s. 340(3)’.
Raus Sharif JCA delivering a separate judgment in Au Meng Nam 
& Anor’s case had disapproved the above observation. His Lordship 
stated:
Much criticism had been levelled against the Federal Court’s decision 
in Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. To some, the Federal Court’s decision 
was plainly wrong and should be disregarded. (See Subramaniam NS 
Dhurai v. Sandrakasan Retnasamy & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 539) ... I can 
understand the learned trial judge’s reluctance to depart from the 
Federal Court’s decision. I join his view. To depart would be to go against 
the doctrine of stare decisis ... it is my respectful view that the Federal 
Court should review its decision in Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. To me, 
by virtue of s. 340(2)(b) of the Code, the title of Adorna Properties 
was not indefeasible as the registration was obtained by forgery. Section 
340(3) does not apply to s. 340(2). The proviso states ‘Provided that 
in this sub-section’ and this sub-section refers to s. 340(3) and not  
s. 340(2). Section 340(3)(a) refers to ‘to whom it may subsequently be 
transferred’ which means that the intended purchaser is the subsequent 
purchaser and not the immediate purchaser. Thus, the plaintiffs would 
have succeeded in this appeal if not for the Federal Court interpretation 
of s. 340 of the Code in Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. But for the reasons 
given earlier, I am not ready to ignore or disregard the Federal Court’s 
decision in Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd.
77 [2007] 4 CLJ 526.
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In fact, the Federal Court had to consider whether to review its earlier 
main judgment in Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v. Kobchai Sosothikul,78 
pursuant to r. 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995. In the above 
case, as noted earlier, it was alleged that an injustice had occasioned in 
the main judgment thereby resulting in the rightful owner losing her 
lands vide forged documents. In dismissing the application to review 
the main judgment, the court stated:
The consequence and effect of the main judgment might be harsh 
when viewed without the benefit of the relevant statutory provision. 
However, this was not a case where grave injustice had occasioned 
due to clear infringement of law thereby making it permissible for 
successive application to be made under r. 137. The substance of the 
main judgment revolved in the interpretation of sub-s. (3) of s. 340 
of the National Land Code including the provision thereof. Based on 
the reasoning given in the main judgment and the words used in the 
said subsection and proviso, the interpretation given by the court was 
not patently wrong thereby resulting in grave injustice warranting a 
successive application under r. 137. There was much force to be given to 
the contention that there should be finality to any litigation. The main 
judgment was handed down by the apex court of this country. The 
application of r. 137 should not be made liberally as that might result 
in chaos to the system of judicial hierarchy. There would be nothing to 
prevent any aggrieved litigant from challenging any decision of this court 
on the ground of injustice vide r. 137. If he succeeds in his application 
there is nothing to bar the other party from making his own application 
to overturn such success. There would be no end of the matter. This was 
not the intention of the legislature when promulgating the said rule.
19.3.3 Federal Court In Metramac Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Fawziah 
Holdings Sdn Bhd
In Metramac Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Fawziah Holdings Sdn Bhd,79 the 
Federal Court had to consider, inter alia, whether the Court of Appeal 
has original jurisdiction in respect of granting interim protection 
78 [2005] 1 CLJ 565.
79 [2006] 3 CLJ 177, FC.
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between the date of the final hearing of the case and the date on 
which the decision is delivered. Earlier, in Fawziah Holdings Sdn Bhd 
v. Metramac Corporation Sdn Bhd,80 Gopal Sri Ram JCA held that:
We are here exercising our original jurisdiction under s. 44 of the 
Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ... I am aware that in Lam Kong Co Ltd  
v. Thong Guan Co Pte Ltd [2000] 3 CLJ 769, Dzaiddin FCJ remarked by 
way of obiter that: ‘It is trite that the Court of Appeal today no longer 
has any original jurisdiction’. That, with respect, is too wide and is an 
incorrect observation. It overlooks the actual wording of s. 44 ... It is 
important to notice that s. 44(1) uses the words ‘in any proceeding’. It 
does not say ‘in any appeal’.
However, James Foong JCA, in the Fawziah Holdings case, expressed a 
different opinion. His Lordship stated:
By the doctrine of ‘stare decisis’ the common law in this country 
has developed much in line with that inherited from the mother of 
common law – England. This means that the ratio decidendi from a 
judgment of a more superior court is binding on all later courts under 
the system of judicial precedent. This is trite law. I therefore feel that 
the Federal Court’s decision in Lam Kong Co Ltd v. Thong Guan Co Pte 
Ltd ... and Capital Insurance Bhd v. Aishah bte Abdul Manap & Anor 
[2000] 4 CLJ 1, in declaring that the Court of Appeal has no original 
jurisdiction, save and except, in the limited scope granted under s. 44 
of the Courts of Judicature Act to deal with any proceedings pending 
before the Court of Appeal is binding on this court.
In Metramac Corporation Sdn Bhd, Augustine Paul FCJ, delivering the 
judgment of the Federal Court, stated:
Gopal Sri Ram JCA is therefore correct in saying that Lam Kong Co 
Ltd v. Thong Guan Co Pte Ltd [2000] 3 CLJ 769 and Capital Insurance 
Bhd v. Aishah bte Abdul Manap & Anor [2000] 4 CLJ 1 were wrongly 
decided. Unfortunately, he is not the right authority permitted by law 
to express such an opinion. As both cases are judgments of the Federal 
Court, he is bound to follow them whether he agrees with them or not. 
80 [2006] 1 CLJ 197, CA.
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The stand taken by him is in blatant disregard of the doctrine of stare 
decisis particularly when the need to comply with this fundamental 
rule of the common law was brought to his attention by James Foong 
JCA in his separate judgment. In order to appreciate the importance of 
adhering to the doctrine of stare decisis useful references may be made 
to Cassell & Co Ltd v. Broome & Anor [1972] 1 All ER 801 where Lord 
Hailsham said at p. 809: The fact is, and I hope it will never be necessary 
to say so again, that, in the hierarchical system of courts which exists 
in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier, including the Court 
of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers. Where 
decisions manifestly conflict, the decision in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane 
Co Ltd [1944] 2 All ER 293 offers guidance to each tier in matters 
affecting its own decisions. It does not entitle it to question considered 
decisions in the upper tiers with the same freedom. Even this House, 
since it has taken freedom to review its own decisions, will do so 
cautiously. That this is so is apparent from the terms of the declaration 
of 1966 itself where Lord Gardiner LC said: “Their Lordships regard the 
use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide 
what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at 
least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the 
conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of 
legal rules”. Gopal Sri Ram JCA himself, in recognising the importance 
of conforming with the doctrine of stare decisis, said in Periasamy s/o 
Sinnappen v. Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 MLJ 557 at p. 582: ‘Lastly, the 
learned appellate judge did not sufficiently address his mind to the 
decision in Khoo Hi Chiang. We find the cavalier fashion in which 
he approached the judgment of a five-member bench of the Supreme 
Court in a case which was an authority binding upon him to be quite 
appalling. We are convinced that the learned appellate judge ought not 
to have brushed it aside as he did. We may add that it does not augur 
well for judicial discipline when a High Court judge treats the decision 
of the Supreme Court with little or no respect in disobedience to the 
well-entrenched doctrine of stare decisis. We trust that the occasion 
will never arise again when we have to remind High Court judges that 
they are bound by all judgments of this court and of the Federal Court 
and they must, despite any misgivings a judge may entertain as to the 
correctness of a particular judgment of either court, apply the law as 
stated therein’ ... We can only add that the castigation of a judge of the 
High Court for not respecting the doctrine of stare decisis must apply 
with greater force to a judge of the Court of Appeal.
Decisions Offending Stare Decisis 
And Its Effect: An Illustration
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19.4 ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT: A RULE RATHER 
THAN EXCEPTION
The doctrine has attained the ‘status of immutability’81 and the 
observance of this doctrine is in the interest of finality and certainty in 
the law. To depart from the doctrine would lead to disarray and judicial 
indiscipline. It was aptly stated by Benjamin Cardozo, in his treatise 
The Nature of the Judicial Process, New Haven: ‘Adherence to precedent 
must be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith 
in the even-handed administration of justice. I still speak reverently 
of the need to respect precedents’. In Dato’ Tan Heng Chew v. Tan Kim 
Hor,82 Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ referred to the earlier judgments 
of Federal Court in Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang,83 and Mohamed 
Ezam Mohd Nor,84 and accordingly advised the lower tier courts as 
follows:
These judgments, being judgments of the Federal Court, are binding 
on the Court of Appeal. Whether the Court of Appeal agrees with them 
or not, it is incumbent upon it to apply the test. However, if the court 
thinks that it has good reasons for disagreeing with the judgments, it 
may, while following them, point out why they should be reviewed by 
this court. But the review, if it were to be done, should be done by this 
court. Until it is actually done by this court, they remain binding on the 
Court of Appeal.
The adherence of the above advice by Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ may 
be illustrated with reference to the case of Thein Tham Sang v. The United 
States Army Medical Research Unit & Anor.85 In Thein Tham Sang’s case, 
the Federal Court held that a claim for reinstatement under s. 20 of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967 is personal to the claimant and therefore, 
his claim for reinstatement expires along with his death. In other words, 
the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona applies in the sphere of 
81 See Dato’ Tan Heng Chew v. Tan Kim Hor & Another Appeal [2006] 1 CLJ 577. 
82 [2006] 1 CLJ 577.
83 [1999] 3 CLJ 65.
84 [2001] 4 CLJ 701.
85 [1983] 1 CLJ 240, [1983] CLJ (Rep) 417, FC.
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industrial law – an action shall abate with the death of the claimant. The 
ratio in Thien Tham Sang’s case was recently reaffirmed by the Federal 
Court in R Rama Chandran v. Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor.86 In 
particular, Eusoff Chin CJ stated:
The claimant is 51 years old and has been jobless for the last seven 
years. Owing to his unemployment he and his family with school going 
children are suffering immense hardship. Should we remit this case 
back to the Industrial Court? To do this will certainly involve continued 
and prolonged litigation which will do great harm and injustice to the 
claimant, and were he to die, his claim will abate as was held in Thien 
Tham Sang.
The rationale in Thien Tham Sang’s case has been faithfully followed by 
the Industrial Court Chairmen in the following cases: Tamil Chelvam 
Sellaiyah v. CGE Utilities (M) Sdn Bhd,87 Teramaju Sdn Bhd v. Mohamed 
Abu Bakar,88 Steven Muthu Savarimuthu v. Redza Security Sdn Bhd,89 
Labuan Duty Free (M) Sdn Bhd v. Ag Bolkiah Pg Mohd Tajuddin,90 Kee 
Huat Industries Bhd v. Panjalinggam Munusamy,91 People’s Mirror, Bre 
Sdn Bhd v. Chew Hock Guan,92 Tamura Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd v. Jaya 
Kumar Jaya Raman,93 Linatex Rubber Products Sdn Bhd v. Paranthaman 
Moothasamy,94 Plaat (M) Sdn Bhd v. Gohbalan P Tharmalingam,95 Vanto 
Organisation Sdn Bhd v. Rajendran Arumugam,96 and Syarikat Kenderaan 
Melayu Kelantan Bhd, Kota Bharu v. Transport Workers’ Union.97
86 [1997] 1 CLJ 147, FC.
87 [2006] 4 ILR 2966.
88 [2004] 1 ILR 1000g.
89 [2004] 3 ILR 1051d.
90 [2004] 2 ILR 260b.
91 [2004] 3 ILR 529.
92 [1990] 1 ILR 242.
93 [2004] 3 ILR 556d.
94 [1996] 2 ILR 1734.
95 [1994] 1 ILR 9.
96 [1993] 2 ILR 428.
97 [1990] 2 ILR 16.
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However, in Hotel Istana v. Nor Azam Baharin,98 the learned chairman 
of the Industrial Court had, while following the ratio of the Federal 
Court in Thein Tham Sang’s case, went on to give his opinion as to why 
the above decision ought to be reviewed. In particular, the learned 
chairman, Dato’ Tan Yeak Hui stated:
Mindful and with respect to the doctrine of stare decisis this court is 
unable to assist the father of the deceased son to make a claim over 
the alleged unfair dismissal. This court stands bound by the decision 
of the Federal Court in Thein Tham Sang v. The United States Army 
Medical Research Unit & Anor and with much reluctance struck off the 
claimant’s case as requested by the company’s counsel It is the humble 
opinion of this court that the judges in the Superior Courts may have 
misread or misconstrued the intention of Parliament. It is hoped the 
time has come for the social activists, reformers and all concerned 
parties to prompt Parliament to debate further this matter so that the 
true intention of Parliament can be ascertained and if appropriate, 
review and amend the law accordingly. Further it is hoped that the 
application of the principles of natural justice be encouraged to roam 
more freely in the Industrial Court and to assert itself in the manner 
envisaged by the creator of the Industrial Relations Act 1967.99
Unfortunately, in Mulpha International Bhd v. Faizal Abdul Rahman,100 
the learned chairman of the Industrial Court went against the ratio in 
Thein Tham Sang’s case. The learned chairman had allowed the case to 
proceed for the hearing despite the fact that claimant had predeceased. 
Rajendran Nayagam, the learned chairman, stated:
The fact that the claimant while awaiting the trial had died, does not 
cause the reference to be abated. This is because the Industrial Court 
under s. 30 has discretion to grant the remedy of compensation, as 
provided by law where reinstatement is not possible. As such, the death 
of the claimant does not prevent the Industrial Court from granting the 
relief of compensation, if it finds the dismissal to be unfair.101
98 [2005] 4 CLJ 241.
99 Ibid at p. 256.
100 [2006] 2 ILR 1034.
101 Ibid.
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He added:
A personal representative can be appointed by the court to continue with 
the proceedings. Unlike the Civil Courts, the Industrial Court is bereft 
of rules providing for the appointment of a personal representative. 
This omission is deliberate on the part of the draftsman of the Act, as 
the Industrial Court is to act according to equity and good conscience 
and not be bogged down by technicalities and legal form.102
Undoubtedly, certainty in the law is one of the pillars upon which our 
justice system rests. However, as seen from the above, some judges of 
lower-tiers tend to disagree with the ratio of the superior court in some 
cases and recently, in some isolated cases they had gone to the extreme 
of refusing to apply the ratio of the earlier decisions for various reasons. 
If the courts below are allowed to offend the doctrine of stare decisis, 
there would be uncertainty as far as the finality of the law is concerned. 
Men of business would be unable to organise their affairs within the 
framework of the law. Members of the legal profession would not be 
able to advise their clients with some degree of certainty as to what the 
law is upon a particular subject matter because they cannot predict how 
it will be decided, among others. In short, the blatant disregard of the 
doctrine of stare decisis could result in chaotic situation.
19.5 RE HJ KHALID ABDULLAH: A REVIEW
Having said the above, it would be worthwhile considering the High 
Court’s opinion in Re Hj Khalid Abdullah; Ex P Danaharta Urus Sdn 
Bhd,103 in relation to the doctrine of stare decisis. In the above case, the 
judgment debtor filed an appeal against the decision of the learned 
Senior Assistant Registrar who had dismissed the ‘Notice By Debtor of 
Intention to Oppose Petition’ filed in accordance with the Bankruptcy 
Rules 1969, r. 117. The rule provides the manner the creditor’s petition 
should be opposed. ‘Where a debtor intends to show cause against a 
102 Ibid at p. 1044. 
103 [2008] 2 CLJ 326.
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petition he shall file a notice with the Registrar specifying the statements 
in the petition which he intends to deny or dispute and transmit by post 
or otherwise to the petitioning creditor and his solicitor if known a 
copy of the notice three days before the day on which the petition is to 
be heard’. The format of the notice of intention to oppose the petition is 
given in Form 16 of the Rules, which simply provides that: “I, the above 
... do hereby give you notice that I intend to oppose the making of a 
receiving order as prayed and that I intend to dispute the petitioning 
creditor’s debt (or the act of bankruptcy, or as the case may be)’. Rule 
18 of the Rules further provides that except where the rules or the Act 
provide, every application shall, unless the court otherwise directs, be 
made by motion supported by an affidavit.
Notwithstanding the above rule, the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Court in Datuk Lim Kheng Kim v. Malayan Banking Bhd,104 and in 
Development & Commercial Bank Berhad v. Datuk Ong Kian Seng,105 
respectively, held that every application shall, unless the court otherwise 
directs, be made by motion supported by an affidavit and not merely by 
filing a notice of intention to oppose the creditors petition. For example, 
in Datuk Lim Kheng Kim, the Supreme Court stated:
Failure to follow r. 18, which requires an application to be made by 
motion supported by affidavit, renders an affidavit in opposition 
ineffective and bad in law because unless the Court otherwise directs, 
challenges to the creditor’s petition or bankruptcy notice other than 
that the debtor has a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand which 
equals or exceeds the judgment debt, must be made by filing a notice of 
motion supported by an affidavit.
104 [1993] 3 CLJ 324.
105 [1995] 3 CLJ 307.
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Again, in Datuk Ong Kian Seng’s case, Mohamed Dzaiddin bin Haji 
Abdullah FCJ, while following the decision of Datuk Lim Kheng Kim 
stated:
This Court has no reason to disagree with the decision and will  
follow it.106
The Court of Appeal however, had, in J Raju M Kerpaya v. Commerce 
International Merchant Bankers Bhd,107 stated a contrary view: “When 
determining an issue under the Act, it is incumbent upon the court 
to accord its provisions a strict construction ... debtor who opposes 
a creditor’s petition must comply with the procedure prescribed by 
r. 117 of the Rules. If he does not do so, any challenge he may mount is 
liable to fail for non-compliance of the Rule”. Again, in Dato’ Sri Teong 
Teck Leng v. Jupiter Securities Sdn Bhd,108 the Court of Appeal stated 
that a notice of intention to oppose the creditor’s petition pursuant 
to r. 117 was sufficient to entitle the debtor to oppose the petition. In 
other words, if the debtor wishes to oppose the petition, he must act in 
accordance with r. 117 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1969. He does not have 
to further file a summons in chambers for the purpose.
Justice Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ delivering the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal in Dato’ Sri Teong Teck Leng stated:
In our view, where the judgment debtor only wishes to show cause 
against the petition, all he has to do is to file a notice in Form No. 16 
specifying the statements in the petition which he intends to deny or 
dispute. That is all he has to do. This has been correctly pointed out by 
James Foong J in Re Ngan Chin Wen ex p Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd 
[1996] 2 CLJ 943. In that case, the judgment debtor filed a notice to 
oppose the petition pursuant to r. 117 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1969 
followed by an affidavit alleging that he had satisfied the judgment debt 
by paying a sum of US$200,000 to the petitioning creditor as full and 
final settlement of the judgment debt. The judgment debtor had not 
made an application or file an affidavit to set aside the bankruptcy notice 
106 Ibid at pp. 313-314. 
107 [2000] 3 CLJ 104. 
108 [2003] 4 CLJ 34.
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within seven days of the service of the bankruptcy notice pursuant to  
s. 3(1)(i) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967. The learned judge held that by 
filing a notice to oppose the petition pursuant to r. 117, the judgment 
debtor had a right to be heard even though he had not complied earlier 
with s. 3(1)(i) of the Act.109
Based on the above conflicting opinions of the superior courts, the High 
Court in Re Hj Khalid Abdullah was placed in an awkward position 
where the learned judge had to take a stand between the decision of 
the apex court and that of the Court of Appeal. In fact, all the above 
authorities were binding on the High Court. The court had to consider, 
inter alia, the issue with regards to the effect of the doctrine of stare 
decisis in relation to r. 117 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1969. In relation to 
the above, Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JC stated:
I take the view that it is not an immutable concept having the authority 
and firmness which is assigned to a fiat of Parliament which is often 
reflected in statute which does not infringe on any of the Constitutional 
provisions. Stare decisis is nothing more than judge made law, which 
requires the decision of the apex court to be followed to ensure that 
there is certainty in the application of law to achieve substantive justice. 
This principle of stare decisis cannot tie the hands of individual judges 
of His Majesty in administering substantive justice when the decision 
of the apex court will perpetuate fraud or reward fraud or the decision 
per se can be said to be abhorrent to notions of justice and fair play 
or inconsistent with subsequent amendments to Act of Parliament 
or rules of procedure, etc ... This is so because each and every judge 
has taken an oath of office individually and not collectively to protect 
the Constitution. When an apex court decision is fatally flawed and 
will cause substantive injustice, then the stare decisis principle cannot 
override the constitutional responsibility of a judge, for if he does so, it 
will be in breach of his oath of his office. When the English Courts were 
dealing with the sanctity of the principles of stare decisis, they were not 
focused on issues relating to appellate courts’ decisions which promote 
fraud or rewards fraud or the enforcement of the decision of the 
appellate court will cause substantive miscarriage of justice, the nature 
of which any courts ought not to condone or entertain. Thus, to apply 
109 Ibid at p. 41.
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the principles of stare decisis to such cases will, in my view, be in breach 
of sacrosanct oath of the office of the judge. Further, perpetration of 
illegality is no part of the doctrine of stare decisis.
The essence of the quotation that can be extracted from the above 
passage is the assertion by the learned judge that while the stare decisis 
is binding on the court, in exceptional circumstances however, the 
decision of the apex court ought not to be condoned. For example, when 
the earlier decision of the apex court promotes fraud or rewards fraud 
or that the enforcement of the earlier decision will cause substantial 
miscarriage of justice (i.e. where the earlier decision was abhorrent to 
notions of justice and fair play) or was inconsistent with subsequent 
amendments to an Act of Parliament or rules of procedure, among 
others. In the aforesaid circumstances, the principle of stare decisis 
cannot tie the hands of individual judges in administering substantive 
justice. The judicial conscience of the trial judge will not permit him 
to act in breach of his oath of office. In other words, the stare decisis 
principle cannot override the constitutional responsibility of a judge, 
for if he does so, it will be in breach of his oath of his office.110
His Lordship added:
In crux, I will assert that the concept of stare decisis must be followed 
unless the exceptional stated applies. That exception must be of such a 
nature that judicial conscience of the trial judge will not permit him to 
act in breach of his oath of office. If the exception applies, then it is the 
duty of the trial court to state in clear terms as to why on the facts of 
the case, he or she declined to abide by the doctrine of the stare decisis. 
By doing so, it will give another opportunity to the apex court to revisit 
the decision to regularise the discrepancies, for one must not forget 
that stare decisis, as stated earlier, simply does not apply to a single 
110	 The	 Federal	 Constitution,	 Sixth	 Schedule	 deals	 with	 the	 Oath	 of 	 Office	 and	
Allegiance.	A	judge	before	resuming	the	office	is	required	to	take	the	oath	of 	office	
as follows: ‘I, .......... , having been elected (or appointed) to the office of  do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will faithfully discharge the duties of  that office to the best of  my ability, that I will 
bear true faith and allegiance to Malaysia, and will preserve, protect and defend its Constitution.’ 
(NOTE - A judge of  the Federal Court, other than the Chief  Justice, a judge of  the 
Court of  Appeal or of  a High Court or a Judicial Commissioner shall use the words 
‘my	judicial	duties	in	that	office’	in	place	of 	the	words	‘the	duties	of 	that	office’).
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decision of apex court which had instantaneously come into force but 
is based on reliable principles tested by a period of time ... No statute 
or procedural law or concept of stare decisis in its true sense, from the 
explicit wording of the Federal Constitution, can restrain the court 
from hearing the merits of the case and dispense justice on the facts 
and circumstances of the case. Thus, stare decisis must not be quoted to 
defend a wrong, when the employment of the apex court decision will 
not subscribe to substantive justice ... It must also be emphasised here 
that stare decisis principle does not stand as a universal principle for 
the administration of justice. There are many faiths of jurisprudence 
which do not recognise the stare decisis concept. For example, Islamic 
jurisprudence does not recognise stare decisis principle.
In arriving at that conclusion, the learned judge relied on the 
proposition derived from earlier writings and decided cases from other 
jurisdictions. In Broom’s Legal Maxims,111 it is stated:
Where a rule has become settled law, it is to be followed, although 
some possible inconvenience may grow from a strict observance of 
it, or although a satisfactory reason for it is wanting, or although the 
principle and the policy of the rule may be questioned The judicial rule 
– stare decisis – does, however, admit of exceptions, where the former 
determination is most evidently contrary to reason. But, even in such 
cases, subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to 
vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For, if it be found that 
the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not 
that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law; that is, that 
it is not the established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously 
determined.
In Distributors (Baroda) Pvt Ltd v. Union of India and Ors,112 Bhagwati 
J observed:
The doctrine of stare decisis should not deter the Court from overruling 
an earlier decision, if it is satisfied that such decision is manifestly wrong 
or proceeds upon a mistaken assumption in regard to the existence or 
continuance of a statutory provision or is contrary to another decision 
111 (10th edn.) pp. 91-93.
112 AIR [1985] SC 1585 at pp. 1597-1598.
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of the Court. It was Jackson, J. who said in his dissenting opinion in 
Massachusetts v. United States [1947] 333 U.S. 611: “I see no reason 
why I should be consciously wrong today because I was unconsciously 
wrong yesterday”. Lord Denning also said to the same effect when he 
observed in Ostime v. Australian Mutual Provident Society [1960] AC 
459: “The doctrine of precedent does not compel your Lordships to 
follow the wrong path until you fall over the edge of the cliff ”.
In IC Golaknath & Ors v. State of Punjab and Anrs,113 Wanchoo J 
observed:
A final appeal is made to us that we shall not take a different view as the 
decision in Sankari Prasad’s case [1952] SCR 89, 195 held the field for 
many years. While ordinarily this Court will be reluctant to reverse its 
previous decision, it is its duty in the constitutional field to correct itself 
as early as possible, for otherwise the future progress of the country 
and the happiness of the people will be at stake. As we are convinced 
that the decision in Sankari Prasad’s case [1952] SCR 89, 195 is wrong, 
it is pre-eminently a typical case where this Court should overrule it. 
The longer it holds the field the greater will be the scope for erosion 
of fundamental rights. As it contains the seeds of destruction of the 
cherished rights of the people the sooner it is over-ruled the better for 
the country.
In Abu Bakar Ismail & Anor v. Ismail Husin & Ors & Other Appeals,114 
Gopal Sri Ram JCA in impugning the decision in Adorna Properties, 
stated:
I would take refuge in the following words of the great jurist Sir John 
Salmond in his Treatise on Jurisprudence (12th edn) at pp. 151-2: A 
precedent is not binding if it was rendered in ignorance of a statute or 
a rule having the force of statute, i.e., delegated legislation. This rule 
was laid down for the House of Lords by Lord Halsbury in the leading 
case (London Street Tramways v. L. C. C. [1898] AC 375) and for the 
Court of Appeal it was given as the leading example of a decision per 
incuriam which would not be binding on the Court (Young v. Bristol 
Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (194) KR at 729 (CA)) The rule apparently applies 
113 [1967] 2 SCR 762 at pp. 816-817.
114 [2007] 3 CLJ 97 at p. 116.
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even though the earlier court knew of the statute in question, if it did 
not refer to, and had not present to its mind, the precise terms of the 
statute. Similarly, a Court may know of the existence of a statute and 
yet not appreciate its relevance to the matter in hand; such a mistake 
is again such incuria as to vitiate the decision. Even a lower Court can 
impugn a precedent on such grounds.
Having said the above, it is submitted that the observation by the 
learned trial judge in Re Hj Khalid Abdullah’s case, in relation to the 
doctrine of stare decisis, has its merits. Where the earlier decision of 
the apex court ‘will perpetuate fraud or reward fraud or the decision 
per se can be said to be abhorrent to notions of justice and fair play’ or 
perpetuate ‘illegality’, among others, that decision ought not to stand. 
Although this may be the case, a logical analysis by the learned judge, 
by all means promoting justice, the doctrine as applied by the courts 
in Malaysia suggests that the courts of lower-tiers are bound to follow 
an unjust decision unless and until the same is reviewed by the apex 
court. However, the learned judge highlighted the application of the 
doctrine elsewhere where it was clearly shown that this doctrine should 
not apply when earlier decisions were given per incuriam or when it 
would result in injustice to the parties, among others.
In light of the above, it has always been the intention of the doctrine to 
promote certainty, stability and predictability in the judicial process in 
relation to the application of the law. It would be worthwhile to heed 
the following advice by learned judges:
(1) “It is ... advisable to follow the doctrine of stare decisis because 
it is a wise policy. It is important that the applicable law be 
settled. There must be certainty in the law. If the courts below 
are permitted to depart from the earlier apex court’s decision, 
it would lead to chaos and judicial indiscipline” per Abdul 
Malik Ishak J in Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd v. Yong 
Wan Hoi & Ors;115
115 [2007] 9 CLJ 416.
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(2) “A final decision of the Federal Court, once pronounced, is 
binding upon the parties thereto and its correctness may only 
be questioned in a subsequent case where the identical point 
of law arises for decision” per Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Tai Chai 
Yu v. The Chief Registrar of the Federal Court;116
(3) “It does not augur well for judicial discipline when a High 
Court judge treats the decision of the Supreme Court with 
little or no respect in disobedience to the well-entrenched 
doctrine of stare decisis. We trust that the occasion will never 
arise again when we have to remind High Court judges that 
they are bound by all judgments of this court and of the 
Federal Court and they must, despite any misgivings a judge 
may entertain as to the correctness of a particular judgment 
of either court, apply the law as stated therein” per Gopal Sri 
Ram JCA in Periasamy Sinnappan v. PP.117
Reverting back to Re Hj Khalid Abdullah, as rightly pointed out by 
the learned judge, judges are expected to uphold the Constitution and 
all the written laws lawfully enacted by the Legislature. To ignore or 
disregard such laws would offend the doctrine of separation of powers 
and this may constitute a serious misconduct in which case disciplinary 
action can be initiated against the individual judge for the violation of 
his oath of office. It must also be remembered that the judicial system 
plays a crucial duty in dispensing justice according to law. Judges are 
constantly involved in the interpretation of statutes. Sometimes they 
have to reach out beyond the statute to seek to a solution to the problem 
at hand. At times, when the enacted law may lead to undesirable or 
unjust results, a judge may be persuaded to add moral or public policy 
shades to the issue in order to do justice, among others. Undeniably, 
this is a very delicate yet important task exerted by individual judges. 
Therefore, where the decision was pronounced by the apex court, the 
courts below are expected to follow that decision in the interest of 
finality and certainty of the law.
116 [1998] 2 CLJ 358 at p. 360.
117 [1996] 3 CLJ 187 at pp. 213-214.
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In relation to the duty of a judge in the decision making process, it would 
be worthwhile reproducing the observation by Richard Malanjum CJ 
(Sabah and Sarawak) in Public Prosecutor v. Kok Wah Kuan.118 His 
Lordship stated:
(ii) ... The courts have to remain involved in the interpretation and 
enforcement of all laws that operate in this country, including the 
Federal Constitution, State Constitution and any other source of 
law recognized by our legal system. The jurisdiction and powers 
of the courts cannot be confined to federal law ...
(v) ... It is now universally recognized that the role of a judge is not 
simply to discover what is already existing. The formal law is so 
full of ambiguities, gaps and conflicts that often a judge has to 
reach out beyond formal rules to seek a solution to the problem at 
hand. In a novel situation a judge has to reach out where the light 
of ‘judicial precedent fades and flicker and extract from there 
some raw materials with which to fashion a signpost to guide the 
law’. When rules run out, as they often do, a judge has to rely 
on principles, doctrines and standards to assist in the decision. 
When the declared law leads to unjust result or raises issues of 
public policy or public interest, judges would try to find ways 
of adding moral colours or public policy so as to complete the 
picture and do what is just in the circumstances.
(vi) Statutes enacted in one age have to be applied in a time frame 
of problems of another age. A present time-frame interpretation 
to a past time framed statute invariably involves a judge having 
to consider the circumstances of the past to the present. He has 
to cause the statute to ‘leapfrog’ decades or centuries in order to 
apply it to the necessities of the times.
(vii) Further, in interpreting constitutional provisions, a judge cannot 
afford to be too literal. He is justified in giving effect to what is 
implicit in the basic law and to crystallize what is inherent. His 
task is creative and not passive. This is necessary to enable the 
constitutional provisions to be the guardian of people’s rights 
and the source of their freedom (see Dewan Undangan Negeri 
Kelantan & Anor v. Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697; 
Mamat bin Daud & Ors v. Government of Malaysia & Anor [1988] 
1 CLJ 11; [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 197).
118 [2007] 6 CLJ 341 at pp. 360-366, [2008] 1 MLJ 1 at pp. 21-23.
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(viii) Though there is much truth in the traditionalist assertion that the 
primary function of the courts is to faithfully interpret and apply 
laws framed by the elected Legislatures, there are, nevertheless, a 
host of circumstances in which the role of a judge is not just to 
deliver what is already there. The role is constitutive and creative 
and goes far beyond a mechanical interpretation of pre-existing 
law. It extends to direct or indirect law making in the following 
ways:
(1) Formulating original precedents
 Life is larger than the law and there is no dearth of novel 
situations for which there is no enacted rule on point. In such 
situations a judge relies on the customs and traditions of the 
land and on standards, doctrines and principles of justice 
that are embedded in the life of the community to lay down 
an ‘original precedent’ to assist the court. Admittedly, this 
fashioning of a new precedent is an infrequent occurrence 
but its impact on legal growth is considerable;
(2) Overruling earlier precedents
 Judicial creativity is fully in play when a previous precedent 
is overruled and thereby denied the authority of law. The 
overruling may be retrospective or prospective. In either 
case a new principle is contributed to the legal system and a 
new direction is forged;
(3) Constitutional review ...
(4) Statutory interpretation
 In interpreting pre-existing law a judge is not performing 
a mere robotic function. The interpretative task is, by its 
very nature, so creative that it is indistinguishable from 
law-making. ‘The prophecies of what the courts will do in 
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the 
law’. (per the American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes). This 
is specially so in constitutional law. Even if it is accepted 
that a judge is bound by the intention of the Legislature, it 
must be noted that such an intention is not always clearly 
defined. The formal law is so full of ambiguities, gaps and 
conflicts that often a judge has to reach out beyond the 
statute to seek a solution to the problem at hand (see Chiu 
Wing Wa & Ors v. Ong Beng Cheng [1994] 1 CLJ 313). A 
judge may scrutinize preambles, headings and extraneous 
materials like explanatory statements that accompany Bills 
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and parliamentary debates to help unravel the meaning of 
statutory formulae. A judge may lean on the interpretation 
clauses of a statute or on the Interpretation Act 1948/1967 
to decipher the intention of the Legislature. Or he may fall 
back on a wealth of rules of statutory construction to aid his 
task. So numerous and varied are these rules that judicial 
discretion to rely on one rule or another cannot be predicted. 
Sometimes a judge’s attention is drawn to foreign legislation 
and related precedents. He may declare the overseas statute 
to be in pari materia with local legislation and, therefore, 
relevant to the case. Alternatively, he may pronounce the law 
to be sui generis and therefore to be viewed in local context 
without aid to foreign decisions.
 When the enacted law leads to undesirable or unjust results, 
a judge may be persuaded to add moral or public policy 
shades to the issue in order to do justice.
 One could also note, for instance, the ‘public interest’ 
interpretation of art. 5(3) of the Federal Constitution in 
Ooi Ah Phua v. Officer-in-Charge of Criminal Investigation, 
Kedah/Perlis [1975] 1 LNS 117 in which the court held 
that the constitutional right to legal representation can be 
postponed pending police investigation. In Teoh Eng Huat v. 
Kadhi, Pasir Mas & Anor [1990] 2 CLJ 11; [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 
277 the ‘wider interest of the nation’ prevailed over a minor’s 
right to religion guaranteed by art. 11. In Halimatussaadiah 
v. Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1992] 1 
CLJ 413; [1992] 2 CLJ (Rep) 467 the court subjected a public 
servant’s claim of a religious right to wear purdah at the 
workplace to the need to maintain ‘discipline in the service’.
 A judge is not required to view a statute in isolation. He is 
free to view the entire spectrum of the law in its entirety; to 
read one statute in the light of related statutes and relevant 
precedents; to understand law in the background of a wealth 
of presumptions, principles, doctrines and standards that 
operate in a democratic society (see Kesultanan Pahang v. 
Sathask Realty Sdn Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 559). He is justified 
in giving effect to what is implicit in the legal system and to 
crystallize what is inherent. Such a holistic approach to legal 
practice is justified because ‘law’ in art. 160(2) is defined 
broadly to include written law, common law and custom and 
usage having the force of law.
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(5) Operation of doctrine of binding precedent
 The doctrine of binding judicial precedent exists to promote 
the principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike. 
It also seeks to ensure certainty, stability and predictability 
in the judicial process. There can be no denying that the 
existence of this doctrine imposes some rigidity in the law 
and limits judicial choices. But one must not ignore the fact 
that some flexibility and maneuverability still exist. Though 
a superior court is generally reluctant to disregard its own 
precedents, it does have the power ‘to refuse to follow’ its 
earlier decisions or to cite them with disapproval. Our 
Federal Court has, on some occasions, overruled itself. High 
Court judges occasionally refuse to follow other High Court 
decisions. An inferior court can maneuver around a binding 
decision through a host of indirect techniques.
(6) Application of doctrine of ultra vires
 Whether an agency has acted ultra vires is a complex 
question of law that permits judicial creativity. Some statutes 
declare that discretion is absolute or that a decision is final 
and conclusive. Some statutory powers are conferred in 
broad and subjective terms. To statutory formulae of this 
sort, contrasting judicial responses are possible. The court 
may interpret them literally and give judicial sanction to 
absolute powers. Alternatively, the court may read into the 
enabling law implied limits and constitutional presumptions 
of a rule of law society. This will restrict the scope of 
otherwise unlimited powers (see R v. Lord Chancellor, Ex p 
Witham [1998] QB 575). Subjective powers may be viewed 
objectively. Purposive interpretation may be preferred over 
literal interpretation (see Public Prosecutor v. Sihabduin 
bin Haji Salleh & Anor [1981] CLJ 39; [1981] CLJ (Rep) 
82). When procedural violations are alleged, a decisive but 
discretionary issue is whether the procedure was mandatory 
or directory. Violation of a mandatory procedure results in 
nullity. Violation of a directory requirement is curable.
(7) Import of rules of natural justice
 Rules of natural justice are non-statutory standards of 
procedural fairness. They are not nicely cut up and dried and 
vary from situation to situation. Judges have wide discretion 
in determining when they apply and to what extent.
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19.6 DISSENTING OPINION
The minority or dissenting opinion arises when the minority judge(s) 
disagree with the majority in respect of its reasoning and/or conclusion, 
and expounds their own views. In Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Tanah 
Dan Galian Negeri Selangor v. Bank Pertanian Malaysia Berhad,119 a case 
dealing with the validity of the registration of title and charge in favour 
of the respondent, the majority opinion by Abdul Aziz Bin Abd Rahim 
and Rohana Binti Yusuf JJCA was dissented by Prasad Sandosham 
Abraham JCA. Again, in Tunku Yaacob Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir 
Tanah Kedah & Ors,120 a case dealing with the actual commencement 
of the proceedings for land acquisition under the Land Acquisition 
Act 1960, the majority opinion was by Richard Malanjum CJ (Sabah 
and Sarawak), Mohamed Apandi Ali, Abu Samah Nordin and Ramly 
Ali, FCJJ. The dissenting opinion was penned by Zaleha Zahari FCJ. 
Likewise, in Simathari a/l Somenaidu v. Panglima Tentera Laut Diraja 
Malaysia & Ors,121 a case dealing with the validity of the appellant’s 
termination from service under the Queen’s Regulations, the majority 
opinion was by Alizatul Khair and Varghese George, JJCA while the 
dissenting opinion penned by Abdul Aziz Ab Rahim JCA. Lastly, in 
Madlis bin Azid @ Aziz v. Board of Officers & Ors,122 a case dealing with 
right of a third party to challenge a declaration of native status given 
to the applicant, the majority opinion was by Abdul Aziz Ab Rahim 
and Abang Iskandar JJCA while Rohana Yusuf JCA gave the dissenting 
judgment. 
The above may be further illustrated with reference to the case of 
Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor v. Victoria Jayaseele 
Martin,123 where the Federal Court vide a majority decision by Raus 
Sharif PCA, Ahmad Maarop and Azahar Mohamed FCJJ, set aside the 
119 [2016] MLJU 15.
120 [2016] 1 MLJ 200.
121 [2015] 5 MLJ 281.
122 [2015] 5 MLJ 844.
123 [2016] MLJU 40, [2016] MLJU 41; Per Rohana Yusuf  J in Victoria Jayaseele Martin 
v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor [2011] 7 CLJ 233.
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unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal on the issue of whether a 
non-Muslim is qualified to practice as a syarie lawyer in the Syariah 
Courts in the Federal Territories. The Federal Court in fact affirmed 
the High Court’s order which held that a non-Muslim is not qualified 
to practise as a syarie lawyer in the Syariah Courts.124 In particular, the 
Federal Court stated, inter alia, that ‘Rule 10 of the Rules the [Peguam 
Syarie Rules 1993] mandating that only Muslims can be admitted 
as Peguam Syarie is not ultra vires s. 59(1) of the Administration of 
Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993.’ It was further stated that 
the Majlis’s rule barring non-Muslims from practising as Syarie lawyer 
in the Federal Territories was constitutional.125 Such discrimination 
is allowed, as this would enable the Syariah Courts to effectively act 
against Syarie lawyer who have breached Islamic laws and the enacted 
rules for instance when contempt was committed by any party.
The minority opinion of the Federal Court by Suriyadi Halim Omar and 
Zaharah Ibrahim FCJJ were of the view that it was ‘never the intention 
of Parliament to shut the doors to academically endowed non-Muslims 
having sufficient knowledge of Islamic law to appear in any Syariah 
Court’. The minority decision was in favour of the unanimous decision 
of the Court of Appeal that the word ‘any person’ in s. 59(1) given its 
natural and ordinary meaning would include a non-Muslim having 
sufficient knowledge of Islamic law. 
It is admitted that the existence of dissenting opinion demonstrates 
judicial independence and it reiterates the principle of freedom of 
expression and freedom of conscience among judges. However, a 
dissenting opinion cannot be underestimated or brushed aside as being 
124 See Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan v. Victoria Jayaseele Martin and Another 
Appeal [2016] MLJU 40.
125 Peguam Syarie or Syarie lawyer refers to a person who has been admitted to practice 
in the Syariah Court pursuant to s. 59 of  the Act. Section 59(1) of  the Act provides 
that the Majlis	may	admit	any	person	having	sufficient	knowledge	of 	Islamic	law	
to be Peguam Syarie to represent parties in any proceedings before the Shariah 
Court. Further, s. 59(4) provides that no person other than a Peguam Syarie or a 
person exempted by the Majlis among members of  the judicial and legal service 
of  the Federation or any person appointed under s. 3 of  the Legal Aid Act 1971 
(Act 26) shall be entitled to appear in any Shariah Court on behalf  of  any party to 
any proceedings before it.
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insignificant. In fact, a dissenting opinion could be adopted in affecting 
future judgments, pushing for amendment and revision of the existing 
laws or a basis for the development of legal doctrine, among others. 
It is noteworthy that in some cases, dissenting opinion has affected the 
subsequent court practise by turning into a majority opinion. In relation 
to the above, the discussion below is based on the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal decision in Brighouse Ltd v. Bilderbeck126 where the dissenting 
opinion in Brighouse Ltd was subsequently affirmed by another panel of 
the Court of Appeal in Aoraki Corporation Ltd v. McGavin.127 
In Brighouse Ltd v. Bilderbeck,128 the redundancy payment was awarded 
despite the fact that there was no express clause in the agreement 
enabling for such payment. It is noteworthy that the former employment 
legislation of New Zealand such as the Industrial Relations Act 197, the 
Labour Relations Act 1987 and the Employment Contracts Act 1991 has 
no provision on payment of redundancy compensation to a retrenched 
worker. Likewise, the current Employment Relations Act 2000 contains 
no such provision and this means that the legislature intended that 
such a provision be left to the parties to negotiate.129 In Brighouse 
Ltd’s case, the New Zealand Court of Appeal had invoked the implied 
term of confidence, trust and fair dealing, to compel the employer 
pay redundancy compensation to employees made redundant, even 
though this had not been specifically provided for in the contract of 
employment.
The brief facts of Brighouse Ltd’s case are as follows. As a result of the 
sale of a company, four employees of the appellant company were 
made redundant with one month’s notice as provided in the contract of 
employment. However, their contract made no reference to redundancy 
payment. The central issue before the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
was whether in the absence of a redundancy agreement calling for such 
126 [1994] 2 ERNZ 243, CA; [1993] 2 ERNZ 74, EC; [1992] 2 ERNZ 161, ET.
127 [1998] 3 NZLR 276, CA.
128 [1995] 1 NZLR 158 (CA); [1993] 2 ERNZ 74, EC; [1992] 2 ERNZ 161, ET.
129 W Grills et al (eds), Mazengarb’s Employment Law, vol 1 (Wellington: Butterworths, 
1994), p 1203.
 
FOR ACADEMIC 
REPOSITORY 
PURPOSES 
ONLY
561
payment, was it open to the court to award redundancy compensation. 
Both the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Court held, 
inter alia, that fair and reasonable treatment called for the payment of 
compensation in a redundancy situation. 
The Court of Appeal, vide a majority opinion of the court130 upheld 
the trial court’s decision. It was stated that an employer is obliged, 
under the implied term of confidence, trust and fair dealing, to pay 
compensation to employees made redundant, even though this had not 
been specifically provided for in the contract of employment. The court 
added that if the contract of employment sets out an express exclusion 
of redundancy compensation, such exclusion shall bind the parties. 
The dissenting opinion was penned by Sir Ivor Richardson. His Lordship 
in dissenting from the majority opinion, stated: ‘To impose obligations 
on the employer to pay redundancy where the parties have chosen not 
to provide for redundancy in their contract and to do so in the guise 
of giving effect to the mutual trust requirement would run counter 
to the statutory intent. It is for the parties to negotiate the content of 
their employment contract and thereby to create enforceable rights and 
obligations. Requiring an employer to pay redundancy compensation 
in those circumstances is to alter the substantive obligations on which 
they agreed. In short, it is not open to the courts to construe an extra 
statutory concept of social justice applicable in redundancy situations. 
In principle, there is no basis for concluding that a dismissal for genuine 
redundancy reasons which meets any fair procedural requirements is 
nevertheless unjustifiable.’
The majority decision in Brighouse Ltd’s case was disapproved four years 
later by another panel of the Court of Appeal comprising a panel of seven 
judges131 in Aoraki Corporation Ltd v. McGavin.132 In McGavin’s case, 
the respondent along with 95 others, were made redundant in 1994 due 
130 Majority decision was by Cooke P, Casey and Sir Gordon Bisson JJ. Dissenting 
judgment was by Richardson and Gault JJ.
131 P Richardson, Gault, Thomas, Keith, Blanchard, Tipping and Henry JJ.
132 [1998] 3 NZLR 276, CA.
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to restructuring of the company arising from its financial difficulties. 
The Employment Court following the majority decision in Brighouse 
Ltd held, inter alia, that the appellant had failed in its duty to act fairly 
through its failure to pay reasonable redundancy compensation. The 
Court of Appeal before a seven Judge bench unanimously disapproved 
their earlier decision in Brighouse Ltd. In Aoraki’s case, the Court of 
Appeal following the minority opinion Brighouse Ltd, stated, inter alia, 
that redundancy compensation is only payable when there is a specific 
agreement to pay redundancy compensation in an employment contract. 
Where the parties to the employment contract have not provided 
redundancy compensation payment in their contract of employment, 
there was no obligation on the part of the employer to pay the same. 
In reaching to this conclusion, the Court of Appeal disapproved and 
departed from the majority opinion on this point in Brighouse Ltd. 
Instead, the Court in Aoraki’s case had adopted the dissenting opinion 
in Brighouse Ltd penned by Sir Ivor Richardson.
In short, the dissenting opinion in Brighouse Ltd v. Bilderbeck was 
followed in Aoraki Corporation Ltd v. McGavin which had in fact 
changed the legal doctrine or position on the payment of redundancy 
compensation in the absence of an express provision to that effect in 
the statute or the employment contract. It is reiterated that a dissenting 
opinion does not create a binding precedent or become part of case law. 
However, its existence does demonstrate judicial independence and 
recognition of the principle of freedom of expression and freedom of 
conscience among judges. 
In relation to Victoria Jayaseele Martin’s case, it is humbly submitted that 
unless s. 59 of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) 
Act 1993 is amended to exclude expressly a non-Muslim from applying 
to be a Syarie lawyer, there is always possibility that the subsequent 
panel of the Federal Court may adopt the minority views in Victoria 
Jayaseele Martin namely, that the said Act had not intended to shut the 
doors to non-Muslims who have adequate knowledge of Syariah from 
practising as a Syarie lawyer in the Federal Territories. The upper courts, 
as noted earlier, are bound by the doctrine of stare decisis in the interest 
of finality and certainty in the law and for an orderly development of 
legal rules.
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19.7 INHERENT POWER OF THE FEDERAL COURT 
TO REOPEN, REHEAR AND RE-EXAMINE ITS 
PREVIOUS DECISION
In civil matters, the Federal Court cannot reopen or review its own 
earlier decision, save in very exceptional circumstances. An attempt 
to reopen, rehear and re-examine the same issues which had been 
heard and finally decided by the Federal Court in the first suit would 
tantamount to res judicata.133 The doctrine of res judicata134 or ‘estoppel 
by record’ is provided in ss. 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act 1950. Under the 
said doctrine, a judgment of a court that acts within its jurisdiction is 
conclusive in that it estops a party in the litigation from giving evidence 
to contradict it, unless it can be shown that judgment was obtained by 
fraud or collusion.
The question arises as to whether the above rule conferred upon the 
Federal Court the power to reopen, rehear and re-examine its previous 
judgment, decision or order on merits. It is noted that pursuant to 
r. 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995, the Federal Court has the 
jurisdiction and power to reopen, rehear and re-examine its previous 
judgment, decision or order on merits. Rule 137 of the Rules of the 
Federal Court 1995 (the Rules)135 provides: ‘For the removal of doubts 
it is hereby declared that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit 
or affect the inherent powers of the court to hear any application or to 
make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent 
an abuse of the process of the court’. The above exercise is primarily 
intended to prevent injustice or an abuse of the process of the court.
133 See Teo Bee Hung v. LJS Resources Sdn Bhd [2008] 1 ILR 411 at p. 417.
134 Res judicata means ‘a matter upon which the court has exercised its judicial mind and 
has come to the conclusion that one side is right and has pronounced a decision 
accordingly,’ per Lord Romilly, in Jenkins v. Robertson [1867] LR 1 HL 117.
135 P.U.(A) 376 of  1995.
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In MGG Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun,136 it was stated 
that: “the Federal Court does have the inherent jurisdiction and power 
which can be invoked in limited circumstances to reopen, rehear and 
re-examine its previous judgment, decision or order which has been 
obtained by fraud or suppression of material evidence so as to prevent 
injustice or an abuse of the process of the court”. Again, in Tan Sri Eric 
Chia Eng Hock v. PP,137 the Federal Court was faced with the question 
whether the inherent power of the court is available only to review its 
own earlier decision or whether it also extends to reviewing decisions 
made by the Court of Appeal. In relation to the above, Augustine Paul 
FCJ stated: “the inherent power of the Federal Court under r. 137 can ... 
be invoked to prevent an injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process 
of any court where there is no other available remedy”.
What is apparent from the above authorities is that the Federal Court 
may reopen, rehear and re-examine its previous judgment, decision 
or order which had been obtained by fraud or suppression of material 
evidence so as to prevent injustice or an abuse of the process of the court. 
It must however, be noted that the said exercise ought to be undertaken 
sparingly and only in rare and exceptional circumstances. It is not the 
intention of the Rules Committee when enacting the above rule that 
every decision of the Federal Court should be subject to review. ‘To do 
so would be anathema to the concept of finality in litigation’.138 As noted 
earlier, the observance of the doctrine of stare decisis is important in the 
interest of finality and certainty in the law and thus, this doctrine has 
attained the ‘status of immutability’.139
136 [2002] 3 CLJ 577 at p. 590, [2002] 2 MLJ 673 at p. 685. See also Chia Yan Tek & 
Anor v. Ng Swee Kiat & Anor [2001] 4 CLJ 61, FC; Megat Najmuddin Dato’ Seri (Dr) 
Megat Khas v. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd [2002] 1 CLJ 645, FC; Dato’ Seri Anwar 
Ibrahim v. PP [2004] 4 CLJ 157, FC; Allied Capital Sdn Bhd v. Mohd Latiff  Shah Mohd 
& Another Application [2004] 4 CLJ 350, FC; Chan Yock Cher v. Chan Teong Peng [2004] 
4 CLJ 533, FC; Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v. Kobchai Sosothikul [2005] 1 CLJ 565, FC 
and Chu Tak Fai v. PP [2006] 4 CLJ 931, FC.
137 [2007] 1 CLJ 565, FC.
138 See Allied Capital Sdn Bhd v. Mohd Latiff  Shah Mohd & Another Application [2004] 4 
CLJ 350, FC.
139 See Dato’ Tan Heng Chew v. Tan Kim Hor & Another Appeal [2006] 1 CLJ 577
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In Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP,140 the Federal Court, comprising of 
Zulkefli Makinudin, Mohd Ghazali Yusoff and Heliliah Mohd Yusof, 
had considered inter alia, the application of r. 137 of the Rules. The 
applicant, Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim, was charged with an offence of 
voluntarily committing carnal intercourse against the order of nature, 
an offence under s. 377B of the Penal Code. While awaiting the full trial 
of the matter, the applicant’s request to have access to certain documents 
and materials was declined by the Public Prosecutor, the respondent 
herein. Accordingly, an application was made to the court pursuant to 
s. 51 and/or s. 51A of the Criminal Procedure Code (‘CPC’) to compel 
the respondent and/or other persons having custody, care and control, 
to produce the documents and the materials requested.
The applicant’s application was allowed by the High Court where the trial 
judge ordered the respondent to comply with almost all of the prayers 
in the application. Dissatisfied with the order, the respondent appealed 
to the Court of Appeal, while the applicant, cross-appealed against the 
refusal of the High Court to allow some parts of the applicant’s prayers. 
The Court of Appeal, in allowing the respondent’s appeal in part, 
held that the applicant was not entitled to the production of certain 
documents, materials and items that he had requested for pursuant to 
s. 51 of the CPC. The applicant’s cross-appeal was dismissed.141
Against the said decision, the applicant appealed to the Federal Court. 
The Federal Court had, on 29 January 2010, dismissed the applicant’s 
appeals and upheld the findings of the Court of Appeal on the ground 
inter alia, that the appellant had not met the dual requirements of 
necessity and desirability as laid down in s. 51 of the CPC.142
Vide a notice of motion filed pursuant to r. 137, the applicant had 
requested the Federal Court to use its inherent powers to review its own 
judgment given on 29 January 2010. The ground for the said application 
140 [2010] 7 CLJ 397.
141 See PP v. Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim & Another Appeal [2010] 4 CLJ 331. 
142 See Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP [2010] 4 CLJ 265.
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was that the Federal Court had erred in its judgment when it did not 
adequately consider the applicant’s application for the documents and 
materials applied for as those documents and materials were vital for the 
preparation of a strong defence. Without the documents and materials, 
the applicant was severely prejudiced and thus, it had ‘occasioned an 
injustice which needs to be rectified and prevented’. Hence, the only 
issue before the Federal Court in Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s case was 
whether this court had the power to review its own judgment given on 
29 January 2010.
As the ultimate purpose of litigants when invoking r. 137 was to invite 
the Federal Court to review its own earlier decision, the Federal Court 
had, in Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s case, considered the impact of 
r. 137. The respondent contended that r. 137 of the Rules does not confer 
new jurisdiction on the Federal Court and consequentially cannot be 
invoked to review its own decision on merit. The above argument was 
premised principally on art. 121(2) of the Federal Constitution, the 
Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘CJA’), ss. 86 and 87 and r. 137 of the 
Rules.
The Federal Court had, on 25 February 2010, in a unanimous decision, 
dismissed the said motion on the grounds that r. 137 does not confer 
the Federal Court the statutory jurisdiction or new jurisdiction to hear 
any application to review its own decision. It was stated that r. 137 
merely conferred upon the Federal Court limited ‘inherent power’ or 
‘inherent jurisdiction’ in order to maintain its character as a court of 
justice to hear any application or to make any order so as to prevent 
injustice or abuse of the court process. The Federal Court’s decision in 
Sia Cheng Soon & Anor v. Tengku Ismail Tengku Ibrahim,143 was referred 
to where Arifin Zakaria FCJ, while making reference to the Rules of the 
Federal Court 1995, stated:
As a subsidiary legislation it cannot exceed the powers conferred by 
the statute pursuant to which it is made, therefore, it cannot purports 
to confer new jurisdiction where none existed before or enlarge the 
jurisdiction, or create or alter substantive rights Therefore, it will be 
ultra vires the powers of the Rules Committee to attempt to confer on 
143 [2008] 5 CLJ 201.
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the Federal Court the power to deal with a matter which is outside its 
jurisdiction. This rule must strictly be confined to procedural matter 
only.
Zulkefli Makinudin FCJ, delivering the judgment in Dato’ Seri Anwar 
Ibrahim’s case, stated:
Notwithstanding that r. 137 does not confer a new jurisdiction or a 
statutory jurisdiction, I am of the view that the term ‘inherent power’ 
used in r. 137 should be taken to mean referring to the judicial powers 
of the Federal Court itself. On this point I agree with the views 
expressed by Heliliah Mohd Yusof, FCJ in her judgment that a certain 
reserve of power intrinsically remains with the Federal Court and as 
the apex court of the Judiciary it has to be the organ to deal with any 
‘injustice’ or ‘abuse of process’. It is in that limited sense that when such 
an application is made under r. 137 that the Federal Court can be said 
to be exercising its ‘inherent power’ or ‘inherent jurisdiction’ to review 
its own decision as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent 
an abuse of the process of the court.
As from the above, the inherent powers of the Federal Court under 
r. 137 is strictly confined to procedural matters only and thus, could not 
be invoked to review its own decision on its merits. In relation to the limit 
of r. 137, His Lordship, Zulkefli Makinudin, cited the following cases:
(1) In Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v. Mitsui Sumitomo 
(Malaysia) Bhd,144 Abdul Hamid Mohamad CJ stated:
In an application for a review by this court of its own decision, 
the court must be satisfied that it is a case that falls within the 
limited grounds and very exceptional circumstance in which a 
review may be made. Only if it does, that the court reviews its 
own earlier judgment. Under no circumstances should the court 
position itself as if it were hearing an appeal and decide the case 
as such. In other words, it is not for the court to consider whether 
this court had or had not made a correct decision on the facts. 
That is a matter of opinion. Even on the issue of law, it is not for 
this court to determine whether this court had earlier, in the same 
case, interpreted or applied the law correctly or not. That too is a 
matter of opinion.
144 [2008] 6 CLJ 1 at p. 6.
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(2) In Chan Yock Cher v. Chan Teong Peng,145 Abdul Hamid Mohamad 
FCJ stated:
On the other hand, no leave to review should be given where the 
previous order is challenged on its merits, whether on facts or in 
law. Merely because the panel hearing the application is of the view 
that an important piece of evidence had not been given sufficient 
weight or that the current panel disagrees with the interpretation 
or application of a certain provision of the law is not a sufficient 
reason for the court to set aside its previous order.
(3) In Badan Peguam Malaysia v. Kerajaan Malaysia,146 Zaki Tun 
Azmi CJ stated:
In Asean Security Paper Mills’ case, I have listed out the 
circumstances where discretion under r. 137 can be exercised 
supra at p. 15. If one were to go through all the cases, injustice 
could be clearly seen even before going into the merits of each 
case. It cannot be applied where a decision of this court is only 
questioned, whether in law or on the facts of the case.
In Asean Security Paper Mills case,147 Zaki Tun Azmi CJ had, with 
reference to judicial precedent, succinctly laid out the limited or 
exceptional circumstances where the Federal Court had exercised its 
discretion to invoke r. 137. They are as follows:
(a) When there was a lack of quorum eg. the court was not duly 
constituted as two of the three presiding judges had retired;148
(b) The applicant had been denied the right to have his appeal 
heard on merits by the appellate court;149
145 [2005] 4 CLJ 29 at p. 45.
146 [2009] 1 CLJ 833 at p. 845.
147 [2008] 6 CLJ 1.
148 See Chia Yan Tek & Anor v. Ng Swee Kiat & Anor [2001] 4 CLJ 61.
149 See Megat Najmuddin Dato’ Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd [2002] 
1 CLJ 645.
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(c) Where the decision had been obtained by fraud or suppression 
of material evidence;150
(d) Where the court making the decision was not properly 
constituted, was illegal or was lacking jurisdiction, but the 
lack of jurisdiction is not confined to the standing of the 
quorum that rendered the impugned decision;151
(e) Clear infringement of the law;152
(f) It does not apply where the findings of this court is 
questioned, whether in law or on the facts (since these are 
matters of opinion which this court may disagree with its 
earlier panel);153
(g) Where an applicant under r. 137 has not been heard by 
this court and yet through no fault of his, an order was 
inadvertently made as if he had been heard;154
(h) Where bias had been established;155
(i) Where it is demonstrated that the integrity of its earlier 
decision had been critically undermined e.g. where the 
process had been corrupted and a wrong result might have 
been arrived at;156 and
(j) Where the Federal Court allows an appeal which should 
have been consequentially dismissed because it accepted the 
concurrent findings of the High Court and Court of Appeal.157
150 See MGG Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2002] 3 CLJ 577.
151 See Allied Capital Sdn Bhd v. Mohd Latiff  Shah Mohd & Another Application [2004] 4 
CLJ 350.
152 See Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v. Kobchai Sosothikul [2005] 1 CLJ 565.
153 See Chan Yock Cher v. Chan Teong Peng [2005] 4 CLJ 29. 
154 See Raja Prithwi Chand v. Sukhraj Rai AIR [1941] FC 1. 
155 See Taylor & Anor v. Lawrence & Anor [2002] 2 All ER 353. 
156 See Re Uddin [2005] 3 All ER 550.
157 See Joceline Tan Poh Choo & Ors v. Muthusamy [2007] 6 CLJ 1.
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The lists enumerated above are by no mean exhaustive as the list of 
circumstances may vary depending on the circumstances of an 
individual case.
Based on the principles enunciated and the guidelines set out in 
the earlier decisions of the Federal Court as above, Justice Zulkefli 
Makinudin, in dismissing the applicant’s application in Dato’ Seri 
Anwar Ibrahim’s case, stated:
[I]t is abundantly clear the applicant had intended to move this court 
to review the issues on their merits. This is clearly outside the purview 
of r. 137. In the present case the earlier panel of this court had already 
delivered a judgment and had addressed all the issues canvassed by 
both parties in the appeal before them. More importantly, it must be 
observed that the due process of the law had taken its course whereby 
the notice of motion filed by the applicant at the High Court had gone 
through a hearing and two appeal processes before the Court of Appeal 
and finally culminating with the Federal Court. The applicant had 
exhausted his legal remedies. On this point this court had on many 
occasion expressed its view that there must be finality to deciding any 
dispute and it cannot be reviewed ad infinitum.
Mohd Ghazali Yusoff FCJ delivering a separate judgment in Dato’ Seri 
Anwar Ibrahim’s case noted the word ‘review’ does not appear either in 
art. 121(2) of the Federal Constitution nor in CJA, ss. 86 and 87. Neither 
is the above word found in r. 137 of the Rules. His Lordship then posed 
the question as to whether the word ‘review’ could be implied from the 
words ‘to hear any application’ in r. 137 above. In relation to the above, 
His Lordship stated:
In the light of art. 121(2) of the Federal Constitution and ss. 86 and 87 
of the CJA, I am of the view that this court has no power to review its 
own judgment. It is clear that the Federal Constitution and the CJA 
have not conferred this court a power to review its own judgment. I am 
also of the view that the Rules is not federal law within the meaning of 
the words ‘federal law’ in the Federal Constitution. The Rules, pursuant 
to s. 17(5) of the CJA, shall be laid before the Dewan Rakyat at the first 
meeting after their publication and may be disapproved in whole or 
in part by a resolution of the Dewan Rakyat. Thus the Rules need to 
be laid before the Dewan Rakyat for approval but that does not make 
it an Act of Parliament within the contemplation of art. 160(2) of the 
Federal Constitution which provides that an ‘Act of Parliament’ means 
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a law made by Parliament. The powers of this Court cannot be enlarged 
through the Rules. Only an Act of Parliament can do that. I do not 
think it is correct to say that on an application by a party to an appeal 
already decided by this court, this court has the power to rehear the 
appeal and review its earlier decision. Rule 137 of the Rules surely does 
not confer such a power. The word ‘review’ is not even there.
On the question whether the applicant was allowed to relitigate the 
case by questioning the lawfulness of the earlier decision of the Federal 
Court when the latter had already decided the appeal on its merits and 
disposed of the same, Mohd Ghazali Yusoff FCJ said:
[I]t is in the public interest that there is finality. In the instant application, 
the decision of this court on 29 January 2010 is final and conclusive. 
I do not think that when the Rules Committee introduced r. 137 in 
the Rules, it was the intention to allow parties to apply for a review 
of an earlier decision of this court in the same action by exercising a 
purported inherent power. It would be unfortunate if this court utilises 
r. 137 to allow a panel of equal standing to an earlier panel to hear and 
rule on contentions that the decision of the earlier panel was wrong or 
incorrect and that the earlier panel had made an erroneous decision.
As the only issue in the instant application was whether the Federal 
Court had the power to review its own decision, His Lordships answer 
was in the negative. Thus, in the absence of any power to review, the 
decision of one panel of the Federal Court cannot subsequently be 
reviewed, reheard, reopened or relitigated before another panel of the 
Federal Court. As Mohd Ghazali Yusoff FCJ aptly noted, ‘an application 
purportedly made pursuant to r. 137 of the Rules where it is sought 
to litigate anew a case which has already been disposed of by earlier 
proceedings is an abuse of process of court’.
Her Ladyship, Heliliah Mohd Yusof FCJ in Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s 
case stated that r. 137 may be resorted to only in cases where a 
procedural injustice has been occasioned. On the issue whether the 
power of a court to review its own judgment is a common law power 
under the inherent jurisdiction, Her Ladyship stated:
[T]his court has no inherent jurisdiction to review its earlier decision 
save on the very limited ground (i) that it contains clerical mistakes that 
makes its order unclear to such an extent that it will cause a miscarriage 
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of justice; and (ii) that one or more of the parties have suffered 
procedural unfairness in the sense already discussed in the making of 
an order, eg, because through no fault of his, he was never heard before 
the order was made or because decision on an appeal is tainted by a 
real danger of bias or a reasonable apprehension or suspicion of bias on 
the part of one or more members of the court who handed down the 
impugned judgment.
Heliliah Mohd Yusof FCJ added that r. 137 does not confer ‘jurisdiction’ 
on the Federal Court. In fact, the word ‘jurisdiction’ does not appear in 
the above rule. Therefore, on the issue of jurisdiction of the Federal 
Court, reference must be made to the Federal Constitution, art. 121(2), 
the constitutional source of judicial power of the Federal Court. 
Further, the word ‘federal law’ in the context of art. 128(3) of the 
Federal Constitution means the CJA 1964 in particular, ss. 87 and 96, 
for the purposes of the determining appeals.
In relation to the ‘inherent powers’ of the Federal Court, Her Ladyship 
stated:
[It] refers to the judicial powers of the Federal Court itself. ‘Inherent’ 
means it is intrinsic or organic to the judicial powers of the Federal 
Court and hence being so the Federal Court draws upon it in the 
limited circumstances prescribed in r. 137 namely to address injustice 
or abuse of processes. A certain reserve of powers intrinsically remains 
with the court for the simple reason that the Federal Court is created by 
the constitution as a judicial organ at the apex of the judiciary. Hence 
by virtue of being at the apex it is only the Federal Court (and no other 
non judicial branch) that has to be the organ to deal with ‘injustice’ 
or ‘abuse of processes’. It is in that limited sense that the jurisdiction 
itself stems from the inherent powers, for the powers being intrinsic 
and organic to the judicial powers of the Federal court, those powers 
may therefore be drawn upon as and when circumstances require. 
It therefore constitutes a separate exercise and more of a rectifying 
process. The exercise of that inherent power will only be triggered by 
an application made to it, upon which the court could be [sic] said to 
become seised of it. In that sense it could be said to exercise an inherent 
jurisdiction ...
In the matter of the application before us, there is not here a question of 
jurisdiction as though it is a new jurisdiction as contended. The court 
cannot confer on itself jurisdiction. We are hearing an application 
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where the applicant is applying to this court to draw upon its inherent 
powers. However, having appraised the judgment of this court dated 29 
January 2010, it is found that the applicant has not been able to persuade 
this court that his complaint falls within the scope of r. 137. The court 
in arriving of its decision on 29 January 2010 has already evaluated 
issues of facts and law and arrived at an interpretation. To accede to 
the issues raised by the applicant is tantamount to permitting a case to 
be relitigated primarily on account of the applicant disagreeing with 
certain interpretation of law. The object of r. 137 is not to defeat finality.
As from the case of Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim, it is clear that a final 
decision of the Federal Court cannot subsequently be reviewed, reheard, 
reopened or relitigated before another panel of the Federal Court. No 
statutory right have been conferred on the Federal Court to review 
its own decision. The ‘inherent power’ of the Federal Court under 
r. 137 could only be invoked in rare and exceptional circumstances for 
example, where there is no alternative remedy available to prevent an 
injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the court.158 In other 
words, such power is limited to hear any application or to make any 
order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of 
the process of the court.
Situations where the Federal Court may review its own earlier decision 
is when the court making the order was not properly constituted159 or 
on ground of illegality or lack of jurisdiction,160 among others. Where, 
if every Federal Court’s decision could be subject to review, it would 
create chaos to the countries judicial hierarchy system in the sense 
that it would open flood-gates to litigation and thus, would certainly 
defeat the concept of finality of a judgment. ‘Certainly, it cannot be 
158 See Badan Peguam Malaysia v. Kerajaan Malaysia [2009] 1 CLJ 833 at pp. 843-844; 
Chu Tak Fai v. PP [2006] 4 CLJ 931.
159 See Chia Yan Tek & Anor v. Ng Swee Kiat & Anor [2001] 4 CLJ 61; MGG Pillai v. Tan 
Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2002] 3 CLJ 577.
160 See Muniandy Thamba Kaundan & Anor v. Development & Commercial Bank Berhad 
& Anor [1996] 2 CLJ 586, FC; Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v. Arab Malaysian 
Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75, FC.
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the intention of the legislature when promulgating r. 137 that every 
decision of this court is subject to review. To do so would be against the 
fundamental principle that the outcome of litigation should be final’.161 
Therefore, save on very exceptional circumstances as enumerated in 
Asean Security Paper Mills case, an attempt to relitigate and/or reopen 
the same issue which had been previously decided in respect of the 
same proceedings and between the same parties would be an abuse of 
the process of the court.
19.8 RATIO DECIDENDI
As noted earlier, ratio decidendi of higher courts are binding on lower 
courts by virtue of the common law doctrine of precedent.162 Ratio 
decidendi is a Latin phrase which lexically means ‘the reason for the 
decision’.163 In pragmatic sense, it is a principle of law adopted by the 
court in deciding a case. According to Salmond, it is ‘the rule of law 
applied by and acted on by the court, or the rule which the court regarded 
as governing the case’.164 Lord Simonds defined the ratio decidendi as ‘a 
reason given by a judge for his decision’.165 ‘The ratio is the minimum 
general principle derived from the judge’s decision on the material facts 
of the case’.166 ‘A ratio is a ruling expressly or impliedly given by a judge 
which is sufficient to settle a point of law put in issue by the parties’ 
arguments ... ’.167 ‘The ratio decidendi of a case is any ruling on a point 
of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step in 
161 Per Alauddin Mohd Sheriff  FCJ in Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP [2004] 4 CLJ 157.
162 Deakin v. Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585.
163 Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary (8th Ed).
164 L. B. Curzon, Jurisprudence (Macdonald & Evans Ltd, 1979), p. 244.
165 See Jacobs v. London County Council [1950] AC 361, HL.
166 Goodhart, Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law (Cambridge University Press, 
1931).
167 McCormick, ‘Why Cases have Rationes and What These Are’, L. Goldstein ed 
Judicial Precedent (1987) p. 170.
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reaching his conclusion having regard to the line of reasoning adopted 
by him or a necessary part of his direction to the jury’.168 In Yusof Sudin 
v. Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Polis & Anor,169 Mohd Ghazali FCJ 
stated: ‘the term ratio decidendi means the legal reasons of the judge in 
reaching a finding in a case before him and it is a fundamental part of 
establishing precedents that is binding on lower courts. It brings about 
consistency to the application of case law. Setting out the reasons for 
a judgment is a fundamental part of the administration of justice. The 
term obiter dictum in Latin means remarks or comments in passing. 
These remarks or comments are judicial observation and are not 
binding. In other words, they are remarks or comments made by judge 
in a decision that do not form part of the legal reasoning in reaching the 
decision.’ In Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd v. Azhar Osman & other cases,170 
Rohana Yusuf J defined ratio decidendi of a case as ‘the principle of law 
on which the court reaches its decision. It has to be deduced from the 
facts and the reasons that the court gives for reaching its decision as 
well as the decision itself.’
When it is said the decision of a case binds others, it does not literally 
mean that the whole decision is binding as it is. Only the rule of law, i.e. 
the ratio decidendi, contains in the decision will be binding upon the 
relevant cases. In addition, every statement of law in a decision of a case 
cannot be considered as a ratio decidendi.171 A statement of law which is 
not part of the ratio decidendi is called an obiter dictum (something said 
in passing). Thus, it is very crucial to identify the correct ratio decidendi 
in the decision of a decided case.
It must be admitted that determining the ratio decidendi is not an easy 
task because there is no single test to do so. According to Cross, it is 
impossible to develop a sole formula to determine the ratio decidendi 
168 Cross and Harris, Precedent in English Law, 4th edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991), p. 72). 
169 [2012] 1 CLJ 448, FC.
170 [2010] 5 CLJ 54.
171 Ibid.
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in a decided case.172 This is because the formulation of it by a judge 
in any particular case is not always apparent.173 Again, nowhere in the 
judgment will it clearly indicate or mention the term ratio of the case.174 
More to the point, a ratio decidendi is open for further interpretation. 
Consequently, later judges might express the ratio decidendi of a case 
in different perceptions and react to it in different ways.175 Of course, 
it does not also mean that there can be no attempt at all to define it or 
to identify it in a case. The question herein is: how do we perceive the 
ratio decidendi?
Despite the aforementioned difficulties, jurists have developed some 
methods in determining the ratio decidendi and these have been 
applied in many cases. The following discussions focus on two most 
commonly used methods, i.e. ‘reversal method’ and ‘facts and decision 
method’. Eugene Wambaugh, an American legal scholar, propounded 
the ‘reversal method’ in which he suggests that in order to determine 
whether a judicial statement is a ratio decidendi or obiter, one should 
ask the question whether the decision would have been different had the 
statement been omitted. If so, the statement is crucial and is therefore 
a ratio. If however it is not crucial, it is an obiter.176 For example, in 
Bridges v. Hawkesworth,177 a customer found some money on the floor 
of a shop and the court decided in favour of the finder by applying the 
‘finders-keepers’ principle.178 The above principle is considered as the 
ratio decidendi in this case because the decision of the case will also 
change if the legal proposition is reversed to mean that the finder is 
not regarded as the keeper. Nonetheless, the problem with this method 
172 James Holland and Julian Webb, Learning Legal Rules: A Students’ Guide to Legal 
Method and Reasoning, 6th edn. (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 162.
173 Ibid. at p. 166.
174 Ibid. at p. 161.
175 Ibid. at p. 165.
176 See Eugene Wambaugh at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eugene_Wambaugh 
177 [1851] 21 LJQB 75.
178 Bridges v. Hawkesworth [1851] 21 LJQB 75.
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is that it may not be simple to apply cases with more than one ratio 
decidendi and reversal of each legal proposition does not affect the 
decision.179
Arthur Lehman Goodhart, a professor of jurisprudence, propounded 
the ‘material facts’ theory in which he suggests that the ratio decidendi 
can be determined through the material facts of the case and the decision 
made in relation to those facts. According to him, the principle of the 
case can be found by determining the following: (i) the facts treated by 
the judge as material, and (ii) his decision based on them. He added that 
the decision of a previous case could be applied in latter cases in which 
the relevant facts of the case ascertained by the court are the same as in 
the previous one.180 For example, the ‘finders-keepers’ principle applied 
in the case of Bridges v. Hawkesworth,181 was not applicable in the case of 
South Staffordshire Water Company v. Sharman,182 where the defendant 
found two gold rings in a private place belonging to the plaintiff.183 
In these two cases, the material facts were not the same because the 
customer found some banknotes in a public place in Bridges case and 
the defendant found two gold rings in a private place in Sharman case. 
Thus, the court decided that the finder can be regarded as a keeper 
only when he found something in a public place. The facts and decision 
method is well applicable in this example if the defendant found the 
said gold rings in a public place as in Bridges case.
Lastly, Lord Halsbury explained the phrase ‘ratio decidendi’ as ‘it may be 
laid down as a general rule that that part alone of a decision by a Court 
of Law is binding upon Courts of coordinate jurisdiction and inferior 
Courts which consists of the enunciation of the reason or principle 
upon which the question before the Court has really been determined. 
179 Abdul Haseeb Ansari, ‘Judicial Precedents: An Expository Study of  Civil Judicial 
System and Shari’ah Court System’, Journal of  Islamic Law Review, vol. 3, (2007), 
p. 145.
180 Ibid. at pp. 145-146.
181 [1851] 21 LJQB 75.
182 [1896] 2 QB 44.
183 South Staffordshire Water Company v. Sharman [1896] 2 QB 44.
Ratio Decidendi
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This underlying principle which forms the only authoritative element 
of a precedent is often termed the ratio decidendi’.184 According to Lord 
Halsbury, ‘it is by the choice of material facts that the court create law.’185
In All Persons in Occupation of the House and the Wooden Stores Erected 
on a Portion of Land Held Under Grant No: 26977 for Lot 4271 in the 
Township of Johor Bahru, Johor v. Punca Klasik Sdn Bhd,186 Abdul Malik 
Ishak J stated:
The use of precedent is an indispensable tool in a court of law. It is an 
indispensable foundation upon which the judge is to decide what is the 
law and what is its application to individual cases. The only thing that 
I can see in a judge’s decision binding as an authority is the principle 
upon which the case was decided (see Osborne v. Rowlett (1880) 13 Ch. 
D. 774 at page 785). In my considered view, judicial authority belongs 
not to the exact words used nor even to all the reasons given, but only 
to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the 
decision (see Close v. Steel Co of Wales Ltd (1962) AC 367; (1962) 2 
ALL ER 953 (HL)). Thus, the enunciation of the reason or principle 
upon which a question before the court has been decided is said to be 
binding as a precedent. What constitutes binding precedent is the ratio 
decidendi and this is ascertainable by an analysis of the material facts of 
the case. It is always dangerous to take one or two observations out of a 
long judgment and treat them as if they gave the ratio decidendi of the 
case (see Monk v. Warbey (1935) 1 KB 75 at page 78 (HL)). It is germane 
to mention that mere passing remarks of a judge are known as ‘obiter 
dicta’, whilst considered enunciations of the judge’s opinion on a point 
not arising for decision, and so not part of the ratio decidendi, have 
been termed as ‘judicial dicta’ (see Richard West & Partners (Inverness) 
Ltd v. Dick (1969) 2 Ch 424 at page 413; (1969) 1 ALL ER 289 at 292).
184 Saeesh Naik, ‘Ratio Decidendi: Wambaugh’s Test, Goodhart’s Test, Lord 
Halsbury’s Test’ at http://www.grkarelawlibrary.yolasite.com/resources/FM-Jul14- 
LT-2-Saeesh.pdf
185 Ibid.
186 [1996] 4 MLJ 533.
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 n
ot
 aw
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
de
ad
 s
na
il 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
bo
ttl
e 
w
as
 
m
ad
e 
of
 d
ar
k 
gl
as
s. 
Th
en
, s
he
 su
ed
 
th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
fo
 
ne
gl
ig
en
tly
 
ca
us
in
g 
he
r 
ne
rv
ou
s-
sh
oc
k 
an
d 
ga
str
oe
nt
er
iti
s. 
Th
e 
iss
ue
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
co
ur
t w
as
 w
he
th
er
 th
e m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
is 
lia
bl
e 
fo
r 
its
 d
ef
ec
tiv
e 
pr
od
uc
ts 
th
at
 ca
us
ed
 h
ar
m
 to
 th
e c
on
su
m
er
.
A
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r o
f p
ro
du
ct
s, 
w
hi
ch
 
he
 s
el
ls 
in
 s
uc
h 
a 
fo
rm
 a
s 
to
 s
ho
w
 
th
at
 h
e 
in
te
nd
s 
th
em
 t
o 
re
ac
h 
th
e 
ul
tim
at
e 
co
ns
um
er
 in
 t
he
 f
or
m
 in
 
w
hi
ch
 
th
ey
 
le
ft 
hi
m
 
w
ith
 
no
 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
po
ss
ib
ili
ty
 
of
 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 ex
am
in
at
io
n,
 an
d 
w
ith
 
th
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
th
at
 t
he
 a
bs
en
ce
 o
f 
re
as
on
ab
le
 c
ar
e 
in
 t
he
 p
re
pa
ra
tio
n 
or
 p
ut
tin
g 
up
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
od
uc
ts 
w
ill
 
re
su
lt 
in
 an
 in
ju
ry
 to
 th
e c
on
su
m
er
’s 
lif
e 
or
 p
ro
pe
rt
y, 
ow
es
 a
 d
ut
y 
to
 th
e 
co
ns
um
er
 t
o 
ta
ke
 t
ha
t 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
ca
re
.
A
s 
th
er
e 
w
as
 a
n 
ow
ed
 d
ut
y, 
th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t 
fa
ile
d 
to
 
pr
ac
tis
e 
th
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 st
an
da
rd
 o
f c
ar
e 
an
d 
in
 
tu
rn
, t
he
 n
eg
lig
en
t 
ac
t 
ha
d 
ca
us
ed
 
th
e 
in
ju
rie
s 
to
 th
e 
pl
ai
nt
iff
. H
en
ce
, 
th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t 
w
as
 l
ia
bl
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
ne
gl
ig
en
ce
.
2.
Ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
 S
oc
iet
y 
of
 G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n 
v. 
Bo
ot
s 
Ca
sh
 
Ch
em
ist
 
Lt
d 
[1
95
3]
 1
 Q
B 
40
1
Th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t 
in
tro
du
ce
d 
a  
se
lf-
se
rv
ic
e 
sy
ste
m
 i
n 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
 
cu
sto
m
er
s h
ad
 to
 c
ho
os
e 
th
e 
go
od
s 
fro
m
 t
he
 s
he
lf 
an
d 
ta
ke
 i
t 
to
 t
he
 
ca
sh
ie
r 
fo
r 
pa
ym
en
t. 
Th
e 
Ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
 
So
ci
et
y 
of
 
G
re
at
 
Br
ita
in
 b
ro
ug
ht
 a
n 
ac
tio
n 
ag
ai
ns
t 
th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t 
as
 t
he
 s
elf
-s
er
vi
ce
 
sy
ste
m
 a
pp
ea
re
d 
to
 b
e 
in
 v
io
la
tio
n 
of
 s.
 18
 of
 th
e P
ha
rm
ac
y a
nd
 P
oi
so
ns
D
isp
la
y 
of
 a
 p
ro
du
ct
 in
 a
 st
or
e 
w
ith
 
a 
pr
ic
e 
at
ta
ch
ed
 is
 n
ot
 s
uffi
ci
en
t t
o 
be
 c
on
sid
er
ed
 a
n 
off
er
, b
ut
 ra
th
er
 it
 
is 
an
 
in
vi
ta
tio
n 
to
 
tre
at
. 
Th
e 
cu
sto
m
er
 
m
ak
es
 
an
 
off
er
 
to
 
pu
rc
ha
se
 t
he
 g
oo
ds
 a
t 
th
e 
ca
sh
ie
r 
an
d 
th
e s
ho
p 
as
sis
ta
nt
 h
as
 to
 d
ec
id
e 
w
he
th
er
 to
 ac
ce
pt
 th
e o
ffe
r.
Th
e 
di
sp
la
y 
of
 g
oo
ds
 w
as
 n
ot
 a
n 
off
er
. 
In
ste
ad
, 
th
e 
cu
sto
m
er
 
by
 
pl
ac
in
g 
th
e 
go
od
s 
in
to
 t
he
 b
as
ke
t 
w
as
 m
ak
in
g 
th
e 
off
er
 t
o 
bu
y 
th
e 
go
od
s 
an
d 
th
e 
sa
id
 o
ffe
r 
co
ul
d 
ei
th
er
 b
e a
cc
ep
te
d 
or
 re
je
ct
ed
 b
y t
he
 
ph
ar
m
ac
ist
 a
t 
th
e 
ca
sh
 d
es
k.
 Th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 
is 
co
nc
lu
de
d 
in
 
th
e 
pr
es
en
ce
 o
f 
a 
ph
ar
m
ac
ist
 a
t 
th
e 
ca
sh
ie
r’s
 d
es
k 
an
d 
th
us
, t
he
re
 w
as
 
no
 v
io
la
tio
n 
of
 th
e A
ct
.
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Ac
t 
19
33
 w
hi
ch
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
se
lli
ng
 
ce
rt
ai
n 
po
iso
ns
 w
ith
 th
e s
up
er
vi
sio
n 
of
 a
 p
ha
rm
ac
ist
. 
Th
e 
iss
ue
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
co
ur
t w
as
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 
ca
m
e 
in
to
 
ex
ist
en
ce
 
w
he
n 
th
e 
cu
sto
m
er
s s
ele
ct
ed
 th
e i
te
m
s.
3.
Ca
rli
ll v
. C
ar
bo
lic
 Sm
ok
e 
Ba
ll C
o [
18
93
] 1
 Q
B 
25
6
Ca
rb
ol
ic
 S
m
ok
e 
Ba
ll 
C
o 
ad
ve
rt
ise
d 
in
 
th
e 
ne
w
sp
ap
er
s 
th
at
 
it 
w
as
 
off
er
in
g 
a 
£1
00
 
re
w
ar
d 
to
 
an
y 
pe
rs
on
 
w
ho
 
sti
ll 
su
cc
um
be
d 
to
 
in
flu
en
za
 a
fte
r 
ut
ili
sin
g 
its
 s
m
ok
e 
ba
ll a
s i
ns
tr
uc
te
d.
 Th
e a
dv
er
tis
em
en
t 
w
en
t o
n 
to
 ex
pl
ai
n 
th
at
 th
e c
om
pa
ny
 
ha
d 
de
po
sit
ed
 
£1
,0
00
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
A
lli
an
ce
 B
an
k,
 L
on
do
n 
as
 a
 si
gn
 o
f 
its
 s
in
ce
rit
y 
in
 t
he
 m
at
te
r. 
M
rs
 
Ca
rli
ll 
bo
ug
ht
 t
he
 s
m
ok
e 
ba
ll 
an
d 
us
ed
 i
t 
as
 d
ire
ct
ed
 b
ut
 s
he
 s
til
l 
co
nt
ra
ct
ed
 
in
flu
en
za
. 
La
te
r, 
th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t r
ef
us
ed
 to
 m
ak
e p
ay
m
en
t 
w
he
n 
th
e 
pl
ai
nt
iff
 c
la
im
ed
 f
or
 t
he
 
re
w
ar
d.
 Th
e 
iss
ue
 w
as
 w
he
th
er
 a
n 
ad
ve
rt
ise
m
en
t t
o 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l p
ub
lic
 
pr
om
isi
ng
 to
 p
ay
 m
on
ey
 to
 a
ny
on
e 
w
ho
 
do
es
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 
cr
ea
te
s 
a 
bi
nd
in
g 
co
nt
ra
ct
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s.
“W
he
re
 a
 p
er
so
n,
 in
 a
n 
off
er
 m
ad
e 
by
 h
im
 to
 an
ot
he
r p
er
so
n,
 ex
pr
es
sly
 
or
 im
pl
ie
dl
y 
in
tim
at
es
 a
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
m
od
e 
of
 a
cc
ep
ta
nc
e 
as
 su
ffi
ci
en
t t
o 
m
ak
e t
he
 b
ar
ga
in
 b
in
di
ng
, i
t i
s o
nl
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
fo
r 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
pe
rs
on
 t
o 
w
ho
m
 su
ch
 o
ffe
r i
s m
ad
e 
to
 fo
llo
w
 
th
e i
nd
ic
at
ed
 m
et
ho
d 
of
 ac
ce
pt
an
ce
; 
an
d 
if 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 m
ak
in
g 
th
e 
off
er
 
ex
pr
es
sly
 o
r 
im
pl
ie
dl
y 
in
tim
at
es
 in
 
hi
s 
off
er
 th
at
 it
 w
ill
 b
e 
su
ffi
ci
en
t t
o 
ac
t 
on
 
th
e 
pr
op
os
al
 
w
ith
ou
t 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
in
g 
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 o
f i
t t
o 
hi
m
se
lf,
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
of
 
th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
 is
 a
 su
ffi
ci
en
t a
cc
ep
ta
nc
e 
w
ith
ou
t n
ot
ifi
ca
tio
n”
 p
er
 B
ow
en
 L
J 
in
 C
ar
lil
l’s
 ca
se
.
A
n 
off
er
, to
 be
 ca
pa
bl
e o
f a
cc
ep
ta
nc
e, 
m
us
t i
nv
ol
ve
 p
ro
m
ise
 b
y 
th
e o
ffe
ro
r 
th
at
 h
e w
ill
 b
in
d 
hi
m
se
lf 
if 
th
e e
xa
ct
 
te
rm
s s
pe
ci
fie
d 
by
 h
im
 ar
e a
cc
ep
te
d.
 
In
 t
hi
s 
ca
se
 t
he
re
 w
as
 a
 l
eg
al
ly
 
en
fo
rc
ea
bl
e 
ag
re
em
en
t, 
a 
co
nt
ra
ct
, 
be
tw
ee
n 
M
rs
 
Ca
rli
ll 
an
d 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
an
d 
ac
co
rd
in
gl
y, 
th
e 
pl
ai
nt
iff
 w
as
 e
nt
itl
ed
 to
 re
co
ve
r t
he
 
£1
00
 re
w
ar
d.
 
FOR ACADEMIC 
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4.
Ad
am
s 
v. 
Li
nd
se
ll 
[1
81
8]
 1
 B
 &
 A
ld
 6
81
; 
(1
81
8)
 1
06
 E
R 
25
0
Th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t 
se
nt
 a
n 
off
er
 l
et
te
r 
da
te
d 
2 
Se
pt
em
be
r t
o 
th
e p
lai
nt
iff
 in
 
or
de
r t
o 
se
ll 
fle
ec
e 
at
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 p
ric
e 
an
d 
re
qu
es
te
d 
an
 a
ns
we
r 
“in
 d
ue
 
co
ur
se
 
of
 
po
st”
. 
Th
e 
let
te
r 
w
as
 
in
co
rr
ec
tly
 
ad
dr
es
se
d 
an
d 
th
e 
pl
ai
nt
iff
 
di
d 
no
t 
re
ce
iv
e 
it 
un
til
  
5 
Se
pt
em
be
r. 
O
n 
re
ce
iv
in
g 
th
e l
et
te
r 
th
e 
pl
ai
nt
iff
 
po
ste
d 
a 
let
te
r 
of
 
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
da
y. 
Th
is 
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 
w
as
 
re
ce
iv
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t o
n 
9 S
ep
te
m
be
r. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
on
 8
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 
th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t h
ad
 
so
ld
 th
e g
oo
ds
 to
 a 
th
ird
 p
ar
ty.
Th
e 
pl
ai
nt
iff
 su
ed
 th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t f
or
 
br
ea
ch
 o
f 
co
nt
ra
ct
 a
nd
 t
he
 i
ss
ue
 
be
fo
re
 t
he
 c
ou
rt 
w
as
: 
th
e 
tim
e 
in
 
w
hi
ch
 m
ut
ua
l a
ss
en
t t
o a
n 
ag
re
em
en
t 
oc
cu
rs
 in
 th
e p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 ci
rc
um
sta
nc
e 
of
 a 
m
ai
l c
on
tra
ct
. 
A
 va
lid
 co
nt
ra
ct
 ca
m
e i
nt
o 
ex
ist
en
ce
 
th
e m
om
en
t t
he
 le
tte
r o
f a
cc
ep
ta
nc
e 
w
as
 p
la
ce
d 
in
 th
e m
ai
l b
ox
.
Th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
ts 
ha
d 
th
er
ef
or
e 
br
ea
ch
ed
 th
e c
on
tr
ac
t b
y 
se
lli
ng
 th
e 
fle
ec
e t
o 
a t
hi
rd
 p
ar
ty
 an
d 
th
er
ef
or
e, 
w
er
e 
lia
bl
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
br
ea
ch
 
of
 
co
nt
ra
ct
.
5.
Br
id
ge
s v
. H
aw
ke
sw
or
th
 
[1
85
1]
 2
1 
LJ
Q
B 
75
Th
e 
pl
ai
nt
iff
 w
ho
 fo
un
d 
ba
nk
no
te
s 
on
 th
e fl
oo
r o
f t
he
 d
ef
en
da
nt
’s 
sh
op
 
ha
d 
en
tr
us
te
d 
th
e 
ca
sh
 i
nt
o 
th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t’s
 h
an
d 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 re
tu
rn
 
th
em
 to
 t
he
 r
ig
ht
fu
l o
w
ne
r. 
W
he
n 
th
e 
no
te
s 
w
er
e 
un
cla
im
ed
 
aft
er
 
th
re
e 
ye
ar
s, 
th
e 
pl
ai
nt
iff
 a
sk
ed
 th
at
 Th
e 
m
on
ey
 w
as
 f
ou
nd
 i
n 
a 
pl
ac
e 
w
hi
ch
 is
 o
pe
n 
to
 th
e p
ub
lic
 an
d 
th
us
 
th
e 
fo
un
de
r 
of
 t
he
 b
an
kn
ot
es
 h
ad
 
th
e 
be
tte
r 
tit
le
 t
ha
n 
th
at
 o
f 
th
e 
ow
ne
r 
of
 
th
e 
sh
op
, 
ag
ai
ns
t 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 w
or
ld
 ex
ce
pt
 th
e r
ea
l o
w
ne
r.
Th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t 
w
as
 n
ot
 e
nt
itl
ed
 t
o 
ke
ep
 th
e m
on
ey
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th
e n
ot
es
 b
e g
iv
en
 to
 h
im
, a
 re
qu
es
t 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
 d
ef
en
da
nt
 r
ef
us
ed
. 
Th
e 
iss
ue
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
co
ur
t w
as
 w
he
th
er
 
th
e 
fin
de
r 
or
 t
he
 o
w
ne
r 
of
 t
he
 
pr
em
ise
s 
on
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
 b
an
kn
ot
es
 
w
er
e 
fo
un
d 
ha
s 
a 
su
pe
rio
r 
rig
ht
 to
 
po
ss
es
sio
n 
of
 th
e f
ou
nd
 p
ro
pe
rt
y.
6.
So
ut
h 
St
aff
or
ds
hi
re
 W
at
er
 
Co
m
pa
ny
 
v. 
Sh
ar
m
an
 
[1
89
6]
 2 
Q
B 
44
Th
e 
pl
ai
nt
iff
 h
ire
d 
th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t t
o 
cle
an
 u
p 
a 
po
ol
 o
n 
th
ei
r 
pr
iv
at
e 
la
nd
. W
hi
le
 cl
ea
ni
ng
, t
he
 d
ef
en
da
nt
 
fo
un
d 
tw
o 
go
ld
 r
in
gs
 in
 t
he
 p
oo
l. 
A
lth
ou
gh
 th
e p
la
in
tiff
 h
ad
 re
qu
es
te
d 
fo
r t
he
 ri
ng
s, 
th
e 
de
fe
nd
an
t r
ef
us
ed
 
to
 h
an
d 
it 
ov
er
 to
 th
e 
pl
ai
nt
iff
. Th
e 
iss
ue
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
co
ur
t w
as
 w
he
th
er
 
th
e 
po
ss
es
sio
n 
of
 s
uc
h 
ob
je
ct
s 
w
as
 
m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
by
 th
e l
an
do
w
ne
r.
“W
he
re
 a
 p
er
so
n 
ha
s p
os
se
ss
io
n,
 o
f 
a 
ho
us
e 
or
 l
an
d,
 w
ith
 a
 m
an
ife
st 
in
te
nt
io
n 
to
 e
xe
rc
ise
 c
on
tro
l o
ve
r i
t 
an
d 
th
e 
th
in
g 
w
hi
ch
 m
ay
 b
e 
up
on
 
or
 in
 it
, t
he
n 
if 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 is
 fo
un
d 
on
 th
e l
an
d 
w
he
th
er
 b
y a
n 
em
pl
oy
ee
 
of
 t
he
 o
w
ne
r 
or
 b
y 
a 
str
an
ge
r, 
th
e 
pr
es
um
pt
io
n 
is 
th
at
 th
e 
po
ss
es
sio
n 
of
 th
at
 th
in
g 
is 
in
 th
e 
ow
ne
r o
f t
he
 
lo
cu
s i
n 
qu
o”
: p
er
 L
or
d 
Ru
ss
el 
G
.J.
A
lth
ou
gh
 t
he
 d
ef
en
da
nt
 w
as
 t
he
 
fir
st 
to
 o
bt
ai
n 
po
ss
es
sio
n 
of
 t
he
 
ite
m
s, 
he
 o
bt
ai
ne
d 
th
em
 f
or
 h
is 
em
pl
oy
er
 a
nd
 c
ou
ld
 c
la
im
 n
o 
tit
le
 
fo
r h
im
se
lf.
7.
So
ut
he
rn
 
Po
rt
la
nd
 
Ce
m
en
t 
Lt
d 
v. 
Co
op
er
 
[1
97
2]
 
1 
LN
S 
14
1,
 
[1
97
4]
 1
 M
LJ
 1
94
, P
C
Th
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
 
tre
sp
as
se
d 
th
e 
ap
pe
lla
nt
’s 
la
nd
 a
nd
 w
hi
le
 p
la
yi
ng
 
on
 t
he
 s
an
dh
ill
, 
su
sta
in
ed
 s
ev
er
e 
in
ju
rie
s 
by
 c
om
in
g 
in
to
 c
on
ta
ct
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
ele
ct
ric
 
ca
bl
e 
bu
rie
d 
un
de
rn
ea
th
 su
pp
ly
in
g 
po
w
er
 to
 th
e 
qu
ar
ry
. I
n 
an
 a
ct
io
n 
fo
r 
da
m
ag
es
, 
th
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
 a
lle
ge
d 
in
te
r 
al
ia
, 
br
ea
ch
 o
f d
ut
y 
by
 th
e 
ap
pe
lla
nt
s i
n 
th
ei
r 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 a
s 
oc
cu
pi
er
s 
of
 t
he
 
la
nd
 u
po
n 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
re
 w
as
 a
n 
al
lu
re
m
en
t t
o 
ch
ild
re
n 
an
d 
th
at
 h
e 
w
as
 so
 al
lu
re
d.
Th
e 
du
ty
 o
w
ed
 to
 tr
es
pa
ss
er
s a
ris
es
 
w
he
n 
th
e 
oc
cu
pi
er
 
kn
ow
s 
fa
ct
s 
w
hi
ch
 s
ho
w
 a
 s
ub
sta
nt
ia
l 
ch
an
ce
 
th
at
 th
ey
 m
ay
 co
m
e t
o 
a p
la
ce
 w
he
re
 
th
er
e 
is 
a 
da
ng
er
 w
hi
ch
 h
e 
ha
s 
cr
ea
te
d 
or
 k
no
w
s 
ab
ou
t, 
an
d 
th
e 
du
ty
 is
 d
isc
ha
rg
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
oc
cu
pi
er
 
ta
ki
ng
 s
uc
h 
ste
ps
 i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
di
ct
at
es
 
of
 
co
m
m
on
 
hu
m
an
ity
 a
nd
 i
n 
th
e 
lig
ht
 o
f 
hi
s 
ow
n 
ci
rc
um
sta
nc
es
 a
nd
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
lim
ita
tio
ns
.
Th
e 
ap
pe
lla
nt
s 
kn
ew
 
th
at
 
th
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
w
er
e 
lik
ely
 to
 tr
es
pa
ss
 o
n 
th
e 
la
nd
 a
nd
 t
he
 p
ro
xi
m
ity
 o
f 
th
e 
ca
bl
e 
to
 t
he
 s
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19.9 OBITER DICTA
‘Obiter dicta’ is a Latin phrase which means something said ‘by the way’. 
According to Salmond, obiter dicta are the statements of law which lay 
down rules that are not significant to the case before the court. These 
have no connection with the material facts as well as the decision 
of the case.187 In this regard, Vaughan CJ observed in the case of 
Bole v. Horton,188 that: ‘An opinion given in court, if not necessary to 
the judgment given of record, but that it might have been as well given 
if no such, or a contrary had been broached, is no judicial opinion but 
a mere gratis dictum’.189 ‘An obiter dictum is a conclusion based on a 
fact the existence of which has not been determined by the court’.190 
‘An obiter dictum is a statement of law in the opinion which could not 
logically be a major premise of the selected facts of the decision.’191 ‘An 
obiter dictum is a statement of law that does not form part of the ratio 
decidendi.’192
In a written judgment, the judge may describe a number of situations in 
which the final judgment would have been different. These statements, 
however, are obiter dicta, or by-the-way or an aside. Sometimes the 
word obiter is used on its own for convenience. For example, if a 
previous judgment states that a decision would have been different ‘if 
such-and-such had been the case’, this is probably obiter, and this is not 
a binding precedent on the current case even if such-and-such is the 
case now. Therefore, an obiter dictum may generally be understood as a 
187 Abdul Haseeb Ansari, ‘Judicial Precedents: An Expository Study of  Civil Judicial 
System and Shari’ah Court System’, Journal of  Islamic Law Review, vol. 3 (2007), p. 137.
188 [1673] Vaugh 360.
189 L. B. Curzon, Jurisprudence, (Macdonald & Evans Ltd, 1979) p. 245.
190 Goodhart, Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law (Cambridge University Press, 
1931). 
191 (Patterson, 1982).
192 Cross and Harris, Precedent in English Law, 4th edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991). 
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statement of law made by a judge on an issue which is not necessary to 
decide in a case.193 The decision of the case will still remain unchanged 
even when it is deleted from the case.
Fundamentally, an obiter dictum does not have any binding effect as 
in the case of a ratio decidendi.194 In fact, only the ratio decidendi – the 
real facts and the real decision – are relevant when applying a binding 
precedent. A judge can refuse to follow anything in a case except the 
ratio decidendi. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are some 
situations where obiter dicta carry great value and have considerable 
weight as persuasive authority.195 In the case of Brunner v. Greenslade,196 
Megarry J referred to ‘judicial dicta’ and stated that their authority 
stood somewhere between a ratio decidendi and obiter dictum as these 
had a weight nearer to each other.197
193 See Darma Suria Risman Saleh v. Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2010] 1 
CLJ 300, FC where the court described obiter dicta as ‘comment made in passing 
and	without	 the	benefit	of 	mature	argument’	 and	a	pure	 obiter dictum lacks even 
persuasive authority.
194 In William Singam Raja Singam v. Meeriam Rosaline Edward Paul & Ors [2007] 1 LNS 
669, Balia Yusof  J stated: “A mere obiter dicta of  a higher court is not binding upon 
this court.”
195 In Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v. Tay Chai Huat [2012] 3 CLJ 577, FC, Mohd Ghazali 
Yusoff  FCJ stated: “The ratio decidendi of  a case is the principle of  law on which a 
decision is based. When a judge delivers judgment in a case he outlines the facts 
which	he	finds	have	been	proved	on	the	evidence.	Then	he	applies	the	law	to	those	
facts and arrives at a decision, for which he gives the reason (ratio decidendi). The 
judge may also go on to speculate about what his decision would or might have 
been if  the facts of  the case had been different. This is an obiter dictum. The binding 
part of  a judicial decision is the ratio decidendi. An obiter dictum is not binding in later 
cases because it was not strictly relevant to the matter in issue in the original case. 
However, an obiter dictum may be of  persuasive (as opposed to binding) authority in 
later cases.”
196 [1971] Ch 993.
197  L. B. Curzon, Jurisprudence (Macdonald & Evans Ltd, 1979), pp. 245-246. 
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In fact, the obiter dicta made by the superior courts are being 
followed frequently in a number of occasions. A good example is the 
‘neighbourhood principle’ propounded by Lord Atkin in Donoghue 
v. Stevenson.198 In this case, Lord Atkin made numerous observations 
with regard to the liability for negligent conducts. One of these was 
the setting up of the neighbourhood principle by stating that: ‘You 
must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can 
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour’.199 The 
word neighbour is further defined in his judgment as ‘[P]ersons who 
are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to 
have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing 
my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.’200
These statements are neither directly related to the material facts nor 
the decision of the case. On the basis of this principle, however, latter 
judges develop legal rulings pertaining to negligence cases such as 
industrial accidents, road accidents and so forth.201
Another example is the case of Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan 
Bhd v. Transport Workers Union,202 where the then newly established 
Court of Appeal took a ‘radical’ move to depart from the Privy Council’s 
decision in South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn Bhd v. Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products Manufacturers Employees Union & Ors,203 on the grounds 
that that decision does not represent good law. The Court of Appeal 
in fact chose to enforce the obiter of the Supreme Court in Enesty Sdn 
Bhd v. Transport Workers Union & Anor,204 that, ‘if there is an error 
198 [1932] AC 562.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
201 James Holland and Julian Webb, Learning Legal Rules: A Students’ Guide to Legal 
Method and Reasoning, 6th edn, (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 168-169.
202 [1995] 2 CLJ 748 at p. 765, CA.
203 [1980] 1 LNS 71.
204 [1985] 1 LNS 148.
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of law on which the award of the Industrial Court is founded, such 
an error, whether of interpretation or otherwise must necessarily be 
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. Any decision in any 
award based on an invalid interpretation or construction of the law 
must surely be a nullity.’
Gopal Sri Ram JCA who delivered the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal in Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan, succinctly stated the 
judicial guidance on jurisdictional error, ‘An inferior tribunal or other 
decision-making authority, whether exercising a quasi-judicial 
function or a purely administrative function, has no jurisdiction to 
commit an error of law. Henceforth, it is no longer of concern whether 
the error of law is jurisdictional or not ... It is neither feasible nor 
desirable to attempt an exhaustive definition of what amounts to an 
error of law, for the categories of such an error of law are not closed. 
But it may be safely said that an error of law would be disclosed when 
the decision-maker asks himself the wrong question or takes into 
account irrelevant considerations or omits to take into account relevant 
considerations (what may be conveniently termed as Anisminic error) 
or if he misconstrues the terms of any relevant statute, or misapplies 
or misstates a principle of the general law ... Since an inferior tribunal 
has no jurisdiction to make an error of law, its decisions will not be 
immunized from judicial review by an ouster clause however widely 
drafted’.205 The Federal Court in Hoh Kiang Ngan v. Mahkamah 
Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor,206 accepted the observation in Syarikat 
Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan as setting the correct principles of law. 
Therefore, an award resulting from an error of law, if committed by 
the Industrial Court, whether within or outside the parameters of its 
jurisdiction, may be quashed by an order of certiorari.
205 [1995] 2 CLJ 748 at p. 765, CA.
206 [1996] 4 CLJ 687, FC. See also R Rama Chandran v. Industrial Court of  Malaysia 
& Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147, FC; Dr James Alfred (Sabah) v. Koperasi Serbaguna Sanya Bhd 
(Sabah) & Anor [2001] 3 CLJ 541, FC.
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19.10 CONCLUSION
The doctrine of binding precedent has attained the ‘status of 
immutability’.207 Strict adherence to precedent of the apex court 
is required so as to ensure certainty, stability and predictability in 
the judicial process. The courts below are bound by the ratio of the 
apex court irrespective of whether the earlier decision was given per 
incuriam. Therefore, with reference to the observation by the learned 
judge in Re Hj Khalid Abdullah’s case that ‘stare decisis must not be 
quoted to defend a wrong, when the employment of the apex court 
decision will not subscribe to substantive justice’, it is submitted that 
the above observation cannot hold in light of the discussion above and 
further, with reference to the observation of the apex court in Dato’ Tan 
Heng Chew v. Tan Kim Hor & Another Appeal.208
In Dato’ Tan Heng Chew’s case, Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ had, while 
referring to the earlier decisions of this court in Majlis Perbandaran 
Pulau Pinang,209 and Mohamed Ezam Mohd Nor,210 provided a valuable 
advice to the courts below: “These judgments, being judgments of 
the Federal Court, are binding on the Court of Appeal. Whether the 
Court of Appeal agrees with them or not, it is incumbent upon it to 
apply the test. However, if the court thinks that it has good reasons for 
disagreeing with the judgments, it may, while following them, point 
out why they should be reviewed by this court. But the review, if it 
207 See Dato’ Tan Heng Chew v. Tan Kim Hor & Another Appeal [2006] 1 CLJ 577. 
208 [2006] 1 CLJ 577.
209 [1999] 3 CLJ 65.
210 [2001] 4 CLJ 701.
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were to be done, should be done by this court. Until it is actually done 
by this court, they remain binding on the Court of Appeal”. Again, in 
Periasamy Sinnappan v. PP,211 Gopal Sri Ram JCA stated:
They [the High Court judges] are bound by all judgments of this court 
and of the Federal Court and they must, despite any misgivings a judge 
may entertain as to the correctness of a particular judgment of either 
court, apply the law as stated therein.
From the above, the apex court is suggesting that the courts below may, 
while following the earlier decision, state the reasons why the apex 
court should review their own earlier decision. Further, the same matter 
may be referred on appeal to the upper court for them to reconsider 
their own earlier decision. This is the solution available to the courts 
below and certainly the preferred method rather than offending the 
doctrine. Lastly, Augustine Paul FCJ, in Metramac Corporation Sdn Bhd 
v. Fawziah Holdings Sdn Bhd,212 delivering the judgment of the Federal 
Court, reminded the judges of the court below that they must strictly 
adhere to the doctrine. His Lordship stated:
Gopal Sri Ram JCA is therefore correct in saying that Lam Kong Co Ltd 
v. Thong Guan Co Pte Ltd [2000] 3 CLJ 769 and Capital Insurance Bhd  
v. Aishah bte Abdul Manap & Anor [2000] 4 CLJ 1 were wrongly 
decided. Unfortunately, he is not the right authority permitted by law 
to express such an opinion. As both cases are judgments of the Federal 
Court, he is bound to follow them whether he agrees with them or not’.
His Lordship added: “We can only add that the castigation of a judge 
of the High Court for not respecting the doctrine of stare decisis must 
apply with greater force to a judge of the Court of Appeal.”
211 [1996] 3 CLJ 187 at pp. 213-214.
212 [2006] 3 CLJ 177, FC.
